Atlanta Divorce Attorney Blog

On February 23, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Dekalb county juvenile court’s deprivation ruling in In the Interest of N.H. (A08A1759). During the course of DFCS’ investigation of a teenage mother and her child which raised significant concerns, the DFCS case worker secured the services of a parenting support company to instruct the mother on what to feed infants and, generally, how to care for infants. During the parenting specialist’s visit to the home, she noted that the mother fed the infant inappropriate food despite instruction that it was inappropriate. As a result of the investigation, the juvenile court found that the mother “had intellectual limitations evidenced by her continued improper feeding of the child.” Despite the mother’s objection to the deprivation finding because the parenting specialist assigned by DFCS only visited the home once, the Court of Appeals found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of deprivation.

On January 30, 2009, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s award of custody to the child’s maternal grandmother instead of her father. In Galtieri v. O’Dell (A08A1822), the biological father, who had legitimated the child, contended that the trial court erred in its determination because it failed to find that awarding custody to him would harm the child.

The Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the trial court’s ruling, stating that “it is clear that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal analysis for determining whether custody should be awarded to…the maternal grandmother, rather than…the biological father.” Specifically, the Court pointed to O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1), which establishes a rebuttable presumption in custody disputes between a biological parent and a third party relative that it is in the child’s best interest to award custody to the parent. To win custody, the third party relative must show by clear and convincing evidence that awarding custody to the parent would harm the child. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s statement that “from the personal experience of the court…it would be detrimental to the child to move from Georgia” was insufficient to meet this standard.

On February 9, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals vacated the juvenile court’s deprivation ruling in In the Interest of A.R. (A08A2411). The children were found to be deprived because their mother had surrendered her parental rights and her father was incarcerated. Notwithstanding the fact that the father was incarcerated and, thus, his location within the state was known, he was not personally served with the deprivation petition. Due to this non-amendable defect, the Order was vacated. As evidence of the importance of personal service, during the course of the appeal, the state even conceded that the order needed to be vacated due to lack of service.

On January 28, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Gwinnett County Juvenile Court regarding the modification of a temporary child support award in a deprivation case. In In the Interest of R.F. (A08A1683), a biological mother’s five children were found to be deprived and removed from her custody, and she was ordered to pay child support to the temporary custodians. She alleged that the trial court erred by treating her motion as one for modification of child support rather than a final child support order, ignoring statutory guidelines in determining the child support amount, and in refusing to modify the previous order.

The Court of Appeals rejected the mother’s argument that her petition was one for a final child support order. The Court questioned whether a juvenile court was the proper jurisdiction for a final child support order, but rested its holding on the fact that there had been no final disposition of the deprivation proceedings and, thus, there could be no final order.

The mother further contended that the trial court erred in treating funds from trust proceeds as her income for purposes of a child support determination. The Court of Appeals easily dismissed this argument, citing to O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(f)(1)(A)(x), which states that both trust income and gifts that consist of cash should be included in calculating gross income for child support purposes.

In addition, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in refusing to modify the child support amount. Interestingly, though the mother was trying to modify her support obligation downward, she argued that the substantial change warranting modification was the fact that the children had increased educational expenses. The Court simply stated that “the fact that the needs of the children have increased cannot serve as the basis for decreasing the amount of child support a parent is obligated to pay” and found no other basis for downward modification, based upon the evidence presented at trial.

In In the Interest of R.J.M. (A08A1919), a mother appealed the Order of the Fulton county juvenile court sustaining a petition for deprivation to which she stipulated and which keeps the child in the custody of Fulton county DFCS. After the minor child was sexually abused by her father, DFCS filed a Petition for Deprivation and the child was removed from the home. Subsequently, an Amended Petition for Deprivation was filed, wherein the mother stipulated that the child was deprived, and the parties submitted a proposed Protective Order to the Judge that would allow the child to remain living with her mother. The court reviewed the evidence and the proposed Protective Order, but decided not to return custody to the mother.

The mother appealed, contending that she stipulated to the deprivation only because the agreement was for the child to be returned to her. On February 10, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the juvenile court, holding that “[h]ad the juvenile court merely followed the parties’ recommended disposition despite reservations it had about immediately returning R.J.M. to the mother, the juvenile court would have acted contrary to its fundamental obligation in deprivation proceedings to protect the welfare of the child.”

On January 29, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that the Husband’s claim for indemnification under the divorce settlement agreement was barred by res judicata. In Stone v. Stone, (A08A2020), the parties separated on August 28, 2005 and the Husband filed for divorce shortly thereafter. During the pending divorce, the Wife obtained five cash advances from an equity line of credit on the marital home and used the money for her own personal expenses. The Wife disclosed this action prior to finalizing the divorce and the parties’ settlement agreement reflected that the Husband would retain the marital home, but that the Wife would be responsible for, indemnify and hold Husband harmless from any liability arising out of this debt.

After the trial court entered a final decree incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement, the Husband sued the Wife for indemnification on the equity line of credit. The trial court dismissed the action after the Wife argued that Husband’s claim was barred by the prior divorce action because it could have been resolved at that time. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that “the breach allegation was not – and could not have been – adjudicated in the divorce proceeding, which concluded when the parties settled the case…” The Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the Husband’s claim, but reversed the trial court’s dismissal.

On February 9, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Gwinnett county juvenile court’s finding that a child was deprived under O.C.G.A. §15-11-2(8)(A), reaffirming the standard that a juvenile court’s ruling will stand if it was supported by clear and convincing evidence. In In the Interest of J.S. (A08A1993), a mother appealed the deprivation ruling, arguing that there was insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals rejected the mother’s claim, since the evidence suggested that the mother had filed numerous unsubstantiated claims of sexual abuse against the father and a young boy at a homeless shelter where the mother and child were living. The Court held that evidence of “repeated unfounded investigations of sexual abuse” has been held to be sufficient evidence of deprivation, and that the evidence in this case authorized the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the child was deprived.

On February 9, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Gwinnett county juvenile court’s finding that a child was deprived under O.C.G.A. §15-11-2(8)(A), reaffirming the standard that a juvenile court’s ruling will stand if it was supported by clear and convincing evidence. In In the Interest of J.S. (A08A1993), a mother appealed the deprivation ruling, arguing that there was insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals rejected the mother’s claim, since the evidence suggested that the mother had filed numerous unsubstantiated claims of sexual abuse against the father and a young boy at a homeless shelter where the mother and child were living. The Court held that evidence of “repeated unfounded investigations of sexual abuse” has been held to be sufficient evidence of deprivation, and that the evidence in this case authorized the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the child was deprived.

On November 17, 2008, the Supreme Court of Georgia reaffirmed long standing case law that it will not set aside a trial court’s factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. In Vereen v. Vereen (S08F0736), the Husband in a Gwinnett County divorce action contended that the trial court failed to consider evidence in making its rulings on child support, alimony, attorney’s fees and a tax debt, and failed to enforce a temporary order in the case.

Specifically, the Husband alleged that the trial court erred in its determination of his income, determination that his age and health conditions did not affect his ability to pay child support, and allocation of responsibility for a $27,000 tax debt to him. The Supreme Court found that the trial court specifically considered extensive evidence on these issues including testimony from the Husband regarding his income and health, evidence regarding his payment of the mortgage and other bills, evidence of his major cash purchases, and evidence that the tax debt was his alone. Satisfied that the trial court did not err, the Supreme Court declined Husband’s request that the trial court’s Order be overturned.

The Husband further alleged that the trial court erred in failing to enforce a temporary order in the case. To this allegation of error, the Supreme Court simply states that “the record reflects no motion by Husband to hold Wife in contempt for having allegedly failed to comply with this order” and “[w]ithout a ruling from the trial court on this issue, there can be no finding of error.”

On January 26, 2009, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued a ruling in Amerson v. Vandiver (S08A1707) regarding a Father’s agreement to termination of his parental rights in a divorce action. In March 2004, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in their divorce action wherein the Mother would have sole, permanent custody of the children and the Father agreed to the termination of his parental rights. Four years later, the Father moved to set aside the Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce alleging that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights.

After the superior court agreed with the Father and set aside the part of the judgment terminating his parental rights, the Mother appealed. The Supreme Court of Georgia pointed out that the juvenile courts, not the superior court, have sole jurisdiction for terminating parental rights, except in the case of adoption proceedings. Nonetheless, the Court went on to say that “[t]he stability of the family and of society demands that one who intends to attack an apparently valid decree of divorce should proceed with the utmost promptness.” The Court reversed the superior court’s ruling and held that the Father’s acts of invoking superior court jurisdiction for his divorce and entering into a settlement agreement which the superior court incorporated into its final decree, coupled with the Father’s four year delay in trying to set the decree aside, prevented him from attacking the agreement.

On November 13, 2008, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a ruling in Kean v. Marshall (A08A0828) regarding the issue of proper jurisdiction for a child support modification action. The original child support Order was in Alabama, but the Mother sought to record and modify the Order in Georgia pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The Mother filed her Petition in Henry County, Georgia, contending that the Father resided there and was, therefore, subject to jurisdiction. The trial court denied the Father’s motion to dismiss the action due to lack of jurisdiction and entered an Order modifying the child support amount.

The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling finding that the evidence reflected that the Father was domiciled in Alabama. The Court of Appeals placed emphasis on the fact that the Father “was registered to vote in Alabama, has always paid Alabama income taxes, has an Alabama driver’s license, and cares for his elderly father in Alabama.” There was also extensive evidence that the Father considered Alabama to be his home and intended to remain there, despite his military placement. Though the Mother argued that he resided in Georgia because he spent time there in the military and entered into an apartment lease while he was there, the Court of Appeals specifically found that the term “reside” does not mean “domiciled,” and that a person’s domicile is the place where the person resides with an intent to remain permanently or for an indefinite period of time. In reversing the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he proper focus is whether the record contained evidence that [the Father] took any action to change his residence from Alabama to Georgia, and the record is devoid of evidence showing any such action.”

Interestingly, in this case, the Order modifying child support was based upon an agreement by the parties with the Father reserving his right to appeal based on lack of jurisdiction.