Atlanta Divorce Attorney Blog

Recently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a Gwinnett Superior Court’s granting of a wife’s motion to strike the husband’s demand for a jury trial in the parties’ divorce action. In a divorce case, either party can demand a jury trial. Generally, “when a party makes a timely demand for a jury trial, the trial court cannot proceed without a jury unless the parties consent to a bench trial by a written stipulation filed with the court or an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record.” OCGA § 9-11-39 (a). One exception to this general rule is that “a party in a divorce case can, by [his] voluntary actions, impliedly waive a demand for a jury trial.” Matthews v. Matthews, 268 Ga. 863, 864 (2) (494 SE2d 325) (1998).

In Kauttner v. Kauttner, the wife filed for divorce and the husband requested a jury trial. Kautter v. Kautter, 286 Ga. 16 (2009). When the case was called for trial, the husband deliberately chose not to attend and instructed his attorney not to participate in the proceedings. As a result, the wife filed a motion to strike the jury demand. The Gwinnett Superior Court granted the wife’s motion and conducted a bench trial, and the husband appealed.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the granting of the motion to strike the husband’s demand for jury trial. The Court emphasized that the husband knew of the trial date and had no legitimate reason for not attending. Though the husband argued that by not attending he did not intend to waive the demand for jury trial, the Court stated that his actions were an implicit waiver and the trial court was authorized to strike his demand.

An important issue for many parents is how payment for children’s extracurricular activities is handled in relation to child support. The Georgia Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Turner v. Turner. Turner v. Turner¸ 285 Ga. 866 (2009). In that case, after nine years of marriage and two children, the parties divorced with the mother receiving primary custody of the children and the father obligated to pay child support. In addition to his child support obligation, the father was ordered to pay 2/3 of the children’s extracurricular activities. The father appealed, contending that he was “paying twice for the cost of extracurricular activities because such costs are included in the presumptive amount of child support.” Id. at 867.

The Georgia Supreme Court agreed, stating that “[t]he language of OCGA § 19-6-15 (i) (2) (J) (ii) makes clear that a portion of the basic child support obligation is intended to cover average amounts of special expenses for raising children, including the cost of extracurricular activities.” Id. The Court referred further to the child support statute, clarifying that if the trial court determines that the full amount of special expenses (which includes extracurricular activities) exceeds 7% of the basic child support obligation, the additional amount must be considered a deviation addressed on Schedule E of the Child Support Worksheets with specific findings as to why such deviation is necessary. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court stated that the way the trial court handled extracurricular activities, by including an additional provision in the final judgment and decree of divorce apportioning them, was improper under the current child support guidelines.

The treatment of extracurricular activities is an important concept to keep in mind. In looking at a requested deviation for these activities, the court is going to want and need justification for these activities, especially if the payor is claiming that these activities are unnecessary for the children.

We recently represented a husband in a successful appeal of his dismissed child support modification action. The parties were divorced in 2007 and, according to the final judgment and decree of divorce, the wife was awarded primary custody of the 4 children and the husband was obligated to pay child support. Specifically, the final judgment and decree stated that child support would be “due and payable. . . until such time as the youngest minor child dies, marries, enters the military, attains the age of eighteen, or is otherwise emancipated, whichever first occurs; provided, however, that in the event that any of the minor children turn 18 years of age while still in high school, [Husband's] child support obligations shall continue for that child until such time as the child graduates from high school, but in no event to extend past the child's twentieth birthday.” (emphasis added) Grenevitch v. Grenevitch, S09A0320

When the parties’ eldest child turned 18 years old, the husband filed a Complaint for Modification of Child Support stating that his child support obligation should be modified downward accordingly. The trial court refused to give the husband an opportunity to present evidence of whether the child had turned 18 and graduated from high school and, rather, dismissed the modification action, finding no substantial change warranting a modification and awarded the wife attorney’s fees.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court’s ruling, thereby allowing the husband’s modification action to proceed. The Court looked at the plain language of the divorce decree and found no ambiguity, reasoning that the language shows that the parties contemplated a change in the husband’s child support obligation. Since the parties contemplated a change, the husband should have been able to present evidence showing that a change was warranted. This case shows the importance of the language in your divorce decree. The court is going to look at the actual language of the Order regardless of whether you or your spouse believes you have agreed to something else. If something is important to you, make sure it is in the Order and written very clearly so that it cannot be misinterpreted.

One of the most confusing aspects of child custody cases can be where the case should be filed when the parents live in different states. Generally, in regards to custody modification actions, the law limits a parent’s ability to terminate the continuing jurisdiction of the court that made the original custody determination in order to prevent the noncustodial parent from trying to use his or her “home jurisdiction advantage” to modify custody to the disadvantage of the custodial parent. There is, however, one exception to this general rule which provides that a Georgia court "has temporary emergency jurisdiction [to make a child custody determination] if the child is present in this state and . . . it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." O.C.G.A. §19-9-64(a).

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue in Taylor v. Curl (A09A0749). In that case, subsequent to the parties’ Jackson County divorce, the mother moved with the children to Florida and the father moved to Walker County. While the children were visiting the father, he filed a petition for temporary and emergency custody of his children in the Superior Court of Walker County, citing mistreatment and abuse of the children by their mother. The mother appealed arguing that Walker County was not the proper venue for the custody modification. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling granting temporary custody to the father, thereby affirming jurisdiction. Since the father met the two requirements outlined in O.C.G.A. §19-9-64(a), the trial court properly exercised temporary, emergency jurisdiction.