Atlanta Divorce Attorney Blog

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently reversed a trial court's decision regarding a restriction on overnight guests during a parent's visitation time. Ward v. Ward, S11A0437 (2011). In that case, the parties’ Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce awarded primary physical custody of the children to the father, with the mother receiving substantial visitation. Id. About a year after the divorce, the parties each filed modification actions and the divorce decree was amended to include a visitation provision providing that the mother “shall not have any overnight male guests while the minor children are present.” Id.

The mother appealed, arguing that the amended visitation provision was overbroad, and the Supreme Court of Georgia agreed. Id. at 2. Presumably, this provision was included to prohibit the mother from having a boyfriend spend the night, but the Court was moved by the mother’s argument that, as written, the provision “prohibits her from having her father, a brother, a new spouse, or even the children’s father spend the night at her house while the minor children are present.” Id. Generally, “a trial court has discretion to place restrictions on custodial parents’ behavior that will harm their children,” but here, the restriction prohibits the mother from having non-romantic male visitors, which were not shown to be harmful to the children. Id. at 3. Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial court abused its discretion in amending the divorce decree in this manner.

Provisions such as the one addressed in this case are fairly common in divorce decrees. A better way to write this provision would be that the mother shall not have any overnight male guest that is not related by blood or marriage while the minor children are present.

In addition to addressing the final decision making issue in Avren v. Garten, the Supreme Court of Georgia also addressed the trial court’s dismissal of the mother’s petitions for contempt, and modification of custody, child support and visitation. Avren v. Garten, S11A0064 (2011). The mother contended that the trial court erred in dismissing these actions. Id. at 3.

The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the mother, holding that the mother’s petitions for modification of custody, modification of visitation, and her petition for contempt were properly dismissed pursuant to OCGA §19-9-24(b), which “prohibits a legal guardian from bringing an action for modification of child custody or visitation rights or any application for contempt of court so long as visitation rights are withheld by the legal guardian in violation of the custody order.” Id. at 4. In this case, there was overwhelming evidence that the mother had left the house with the child on scheduled visitation days during the time in which the father was to pick up the child. Id. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial court did not err when it dismissed these actions. Id. at 5.

The Supreme Court of Georgia also held that the mother’s petition for modification of child support was properly dismissed due to the “two-year rule.” This rule provides that “[n]o petition to modify child support may be filed by either parent within a period of two years from the date of the final order on a previous petition to modify by the same parent.” OCGA §19-6-15(k)(2). In this case, the mother filed the current petition only 11 months after her previous petition for modification of child support. Id. at 6. Since it had been less than two years, the mother's petition was properly dismissed. Id. at 7.

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently heard an appeal regarding final decision making authority in a Georgia divorce decree. Avren v. Garten, S11A0064 (2011). In that case, the parties were divorced, and the final order awarded the father final decision making authority for the child regarding health and medical issues. Id. at 2. The trial court subsequently found the mother in contempt for taking the parties’ minor child to counseling over the father's objection, and the mother appealed. Id.

The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the mother’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in finding her in contempt. The Court specifically noted that “[m]other acknowledged at the contempt hearing that she had taken the child to a therapist that Father disapproved,” despite the fact that the father had final decision making authority on this issue. Id. at 3. These facts provided sufficient evidence “to support the trial court’s determination that Mother willfully disobeyed a prior court order” and, thus, the finding of contempt was upheld. Id.

The 9th Judicial District (Forsyth and Cherokee counties) recently added another June parenting seminar date:

Saturday, June 25, 2011, 10:00am – 2:00pm in Cumming at the Central Park Recreation Center (2300 Keith Bridge Road)

The cost of the seminar is $50.00 per person. There is no pre-registration and you must arrive 30 minutes early to register. You can find additional information about these seminars at 9th Judicial Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution website. Check back for parenting seminar dates for July – September 2011.

Georgia divorce attorneys are often asked what happens when one party is dragging their feet and costing the other more in attorney’s fees. With divorces, often there is a high level of emotion involved, causing people to fight longer and harder, whether they are conscious of it or not. Luckily, there is a Georgia statute that cover such a situation.

Attorney’s fees for frivolous litigation may be awarded if the court “finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification or that the action, or any part thereof, was interposed for delay or harassment, or if it finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct, including, but not limited to, abuses of discovery procedures.” OCGA §9-15-14(b). “As used in this Code section, ‘lacked substantial justification’ means substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.” Id. An example of a situation where fees may be awarded under this subsection is where one party refuses to cooperate with a Guardian ad Litem, or continuously refuses to answer discovery.

In addition, attorney’s fees are required to be awarded, when requested, if the other party “has asserted a claim, defense, or other position with respect to which there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or other position.” OCGA §9-15-14(a). This is an extremely high standard and fees are not as likely under this subsection as under the one discussed above.

Fees awarded under this code section “shall not exceed amounts which are reasonable and necessary for defending or asserting the rights of a party.” OCGA §9-15-14(d). Thus, you cannot arbitrarily ask for $10,000 to punish the other party – you must prove that the amount is reasonable in light of the actions of the other party.

The Supreme Court of Georgia often hears appeals of custody determinations, though the standard to overturn a trial court's ruling on this issue is very high. In a recent case, the parties’ Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce awarded the parties joint legal custody of their eight-year-old daughter, with the Wife receiving primary physical custody and the Husband receiving visitation. Reed v. Reed, S11A0085 (2011). The Husband appealed, challenging the trial court’s custody determination. Id.

The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the Husband, emphasizing long standing Georgia law that, so long as the trial court used its discretion “to determine solely what is for the best interest of the child and what will best promote the child’s welfare and happiness,” the Court will not interfere. Id. at 1-2; OCGA §19-9-3(a)(2). The Court found that there was “ample evidence” to support the trial court’s custody award, specifically that “...Wife had served as primary caregiver since the child’s birth and had a strong, loving relationship with the child, and that Husband had on occasions both before and during the divorce proceedings exhibited conduct casting doubt on his trustworthiness, truthfulness, and judgment.” Reed, at 2. The Supreme Court of Georgia touched on the Husband’s argument that the trial court “failed to consider the Wife’s anticipated move to North Carolina,” but held that the trial court considered this fact and “did not find it dispositive with regard to the child’s best interests.” Id. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the judgment was affirmed.

A question Georgia divorce attorneys are often asked is “Who pays for the divorce?” Generally, each party pays for their own attorney’s fees. However, there are safeguards in place to protect a spouse who has no access to marital assets from the spouse who is using these assets at his/her disposal. Georgia law specifically states that the grant of attorney’s fees shall be within the sound discretion of the trial court so long as the court considers the financial circumstances of both parties a part of its determination. OCGA §19-6-2(a)(1). The fees can be awarded in full, at the end of the divorce proceeding, or on account, which means the spouse ordered to pay the other’s fees must pay them as they become due. OCGA §19-6-2(a)(2). Attorney’s fees may be awarded at a temporary hearing, a final hearing, or both, if the financial circumstances warrant the awards. OCGA §19-6-2(b). Just as any other order, an award of attorney’s fees can be enforced by an action for contempt.

Consider a couple that is going through a divorce, and all the marital accounts are in the husband’s name. The wife cannot make any withdrawals from the marital accounts, or even sign checks, because her name is not on the accounts. Thus, she is likely unable to pay a retainer or to keep up with monthly attorney bills. In this situation, we would highly recommend that the wife make a motion for attorney’s fees, so that she may utilize the martial accounts and defend herself equitably in the divorce action.

If you are considering appealing a Georgia custody order, it is important to consider the timing of your appeal. In a recent custody modification case, the trial court modified the parties’ divorce decree, changing custody from the mother to the father and ordering the mother to commence paying child support. Francis-Rolle v. Harvey, A11A0357 (2011). The mother appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting custody of the parties’ 17-year-old child to the father. Id.

Shortly after the appeal was docketed, the child turned 18 years of age. Id. at 2. The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the mother’s appeal of the custody order as moot since “at 18 years of age the child has reached the age of legal majority and is no longer subject to the custody order.” Id.

Though it is understandable that the mother was upset about the outcome of the custody modification case, her attorney should have advised her that her time and money would have been better spent on the other issues she raised on appeal.