Atlanta Divorce Attorney Blog

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently heard an appeal of the grant of a legitimation petition, where the father was absent during the majority of the pregnancy, but in the child’s life from the moment he was born. Caldwell v. Meadows, A11A1031 (2011). In that case, the parties had a short relationship and then had virtually no contact during the pregnancy. Id. at 3. Toward the end of the pregnancy, the parties reconnected and even went shopping together for the baby. Id. The father visited the child in the hospital after he was born, and the mother and child moved in with the father for several days after coming home from the hospital. Id. at 4. After the mother moved to Georgia with the child, the father voluntarily paid child support, provided health insurance, and visited the child 22 times over two years. Id. at 4. After being asked by the mother’s attorney not to contact the child anymore, the father filed a petition for legitimation, which was granted by the trial court, along with joint legal custody and visitation for the father. Id. at 1 and 4.

The mother appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in excluding the issue of the father’s abandonment during the pregnancy. Id. at 1. The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that “[w]hile a father’s lack of involvement prior to a child’s birth ‘is as significant as such a disregard after the child is born,’ we are aware of no authority limiting a trial court’s inquiry into whether a father has abandoned his opportunity interest to the period before the child’s birth especially where, as here, the father evinced such a clear intent to be involved in his child’s life following his birth.” Id. at 6-7; quoting Turner v. Wright, 217 Ga. App. 368, 369 (1995). The question in considering whether the father had legally abandoned his child is not whether “the father could have done more,” but rather whether the father “has done so little as to constitute abandonment.” Id. at 7; quoting Binns v. Fairnot, 292 Ga .App. 336 (2008). In this case, this father was more involved than many out of town parents in his child’s life. Thus, there was clearly no abandonment.

With the holiday season upon us, many divorced parents in Georgia will look to their parenting plan for guidance on arranging their holiday schedules. Parenting plans are custody agreements that are submitted jointly or individually by each party in an action that involves child custody in Georgia. Except in those cases where emergency relief is necessary due to family violence, parenting plans are required in all actions in Georgia where child custody is at issue.

A parenting plan may be temporary until a final decree is entered, at which time a permanent parenting plan will go into effect. Under Georgia law, when considering either a joint plan or opposing plans of the parties, the court must make its determination based upon the best interest of the child. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3. The court bases its determination on a number of factors including, but not limited to, the relationship that exists between each parent and the child, and the ability of each parent to provide the child with basic necessities. Id. at a(3).

Parenting plans require that both parties acknowledge and decide on a variety of issues. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1. Holiday visitation is one such issue, and it can be difficult and emotional for parties to come to an agreement because it requires each party to agree to some holidays away from their children. It may never be easy to split time with your child and the other parent, but a successful parenting plan can alleviate tensions between the parties and allow each parent to enjoy time with their child.

If you need help creating a parenting plan, or seek to modify your existing parenting plan, please contact our Atlanta divorce attorneys to assist you in the process.

By Courtney Carpenter, Associate Attorney, Meriwether & Tharp LLC

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently heard a case addressing an alleged modification of a divorce decree in a contempt case. In that case, the parties had joint legal and physical custody of their children. Earle v. Earle, A11A1450 (2011). The father had final decision-making authority over extracurricular activities. Id. at 2. The father later filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the mother refused “to allow the daughter to participate in certain golf tournaments during her custodial time, and for continuing to use a golf instructor for the child that [the father] had previously fired.” Id. at 2-3. After a hearing, the court denied the father’s motion, holding that “the mother could use her custodial time with the children ‘in any way she deems appropriate.’” Id. at 3.

The father appealed, contending that “the trial court improperly modified the original divorce decree” by adding the new language above “which results in a material modification of the decree’s provision regarding his final decision making authority concerning the children’s extracurricular activities.” Id. at 4. The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed with the father, stating that though a court cannot modify a divorce decree in a contempt order, it can interpret and clarify its own orders. Id. at 5. The Court held that, in this case, “the trial court did not impermissibly modify the earlier decree but instead clarified the extent as to which the father’s decision making as to children’s extracurricular activities could encroach upon the mother’s custodial time.” Id.

This case addresses an interesting issue that can come up post-divorce. If you have final decision making regarding extracurricular activities, it now seems that you must take your former spouse’s custodial time into consideration in scheduling these activities. After this case, one probably should not over schedule the children during the times in which they are in the custody of the other parent.

Georgia divorce lawyers are often asked how long an average divorce takes in this state. This is a difficult question to answer because there is not really an “average” divorce case. The length of time depends greatly on whether the parties are able to settle matters and, if not, what issues they are fighting about. Even cases with similar facts can be very different. For example, consider a case where both parties work, and have 2 children, a marital home, several joint accounts, and some separate property. Some parties with these facts are able to resolve everything fairly quickly and easily. Other parties with these same facts, however, may argue over every custody, child support, alimony and/or equitable division of assets. Even one contested issue can cause a divorce to drag on, especially if it is something about which both parties feel passionate.

The length of a divorce case can also depend on the County in which the divorce is filed because some courts are more back logged than others. Often, there is not much you can do about this issue.

In our experience, the average time range for a divorce in Georgia is 45 days for a completely uncontested divorce to about 3 years for a hotly contested divorce. However, as mentioned above, this time can vary greatly based upon the specific facts of your case.

In Georgia, a spouse who has an affair risks the affair playing a large role in the outcome of the divorce case, specifically with the issue of support. First and foremost, adultery is an absolute bar to alimony in Georgia. This means that the person who had the affair is not entitled to alimony, whether they need it or not, and will not be successful on a claim for alimony in court.

On the other hand, adultery does not impact child support as this support belongs to the child, not the parent. Thus, anything relating to child support, such as daycare, medical, and extracurricular expenses for the children, will still be up for discussion and will be shared according to the child support worksheets. It should be noted, however, that adultery can affect child custody, which will determine who pays child support. If a parent has committed adultery in the presence of the children, this parent is acting contrary to the children’s best interests (the standard for determining custody in Georgia), which could result in that parent losing a custody battle and then having the obligation to pay child support.

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently heard a case dealing with supervised visitation that was to be phased out through a transition period. In Sigal v. Sigal, before filing for divorce, the mother first filed a petition for separate maintenance. Sigal v. Sigal, S11F0835 (2011). In the decree from that case, the mother was granted primary custody and the father’s visitation was required to be supervised as a result of his documented drug and alcohol abuse problems. Id. at 2. The mother subsequently filed for divorce and “asserted that all issues regarding custody, visitation and support of the children were fully adjudicated in the decree of separate maintenance.” Id. The father disagreed and sought “reasonable and fair unsupervised visitation” with the children. Id. After hearing testimony from both parties, the trial court orally announced its ruling, holding that the father could have unsupervised visitation provided that he took and passed a drug test within the next 45 days and provided that the unsupervised visitation be phased in over a three month transition period. Id. at 3-4.

For reasons unknown, the final divorce decree was not entered for several months, though the visitation provision was entered nunc pro tunc from the date of the hearing. (This means that the visitation provision went into effect as of the date of the hearing, rather than the date of the final divorce decree). Id. at 4-5. As a result, the three-month transition period had already expired by the time the final decree was entered. Id.

For this reason, the mother appealed, and the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court’s ruling. The Court held that “the nunc pro tunc action as to the gradual transition provision in the decree here did not serve to conform the decree to the truth or the justice of the situation as originally intended by the trial court.” Id. at 7. “Rather, it had the exact opposite effect by eliminating the truth and justice recognized by the trial court…regarding the need of these children for a gradual transition period from supervised to unsupervised visitation with their father.” Id. at 7-8. For this reason, the trial court abused its discretion in making the visitation provision nunc pro tunc.

A recent Georgia divorce case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to payment of transcript costs. Kent v. Kent, S11F1035 (2011). In that case, before the trial began, the judge asked the parties who had requested the court reporter and who would be responsible for her salary. Id. The Wife’s attorney responded that he had requested the court reporter and would be responsible for her cost, but the Husband’s attorney remained silent. Id. at 1-2. Only after the trial and after the judge had left the bench did the Husband’s attorney state that he would not pay for the court reporter cost. Id. After receiving an unfavorable outcome to the case, the Husband’s attorney filed a motion “to require the court reporter to transcribe her notes and provide him with an official transcript of the trial” so he could use it on appeal, adding that he was not willing to pay the entire cost of the court reporter. Id at 2-3. The trial court denied the Husband’s motion, finding that his failure to participate in the takedown costs was intentional and he could not now “take advantage of his opponent by only agreeing to pay for the costs of the court reporter now that he is certain that he needs the transcript.” Id. at 4.

The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the trial court, citing long standing Georgia law which holds that, if there is express refusal to participate in the costs of the court reporter, the opposing party cannot later “compel the reporter to transcribe his stenographic notes” even with an offer to pay for same. Id. at 7; quoting Harrington v. Harrington, 224 Ga. 305, 306 (1968). However, a “mere failure” to respond to inquiries about court reporter costs does not amount to an express refusal. Kent, at 7. The Supreme Court of Georgia justified this reasoning, explaining: “By placing this affirmative burden on the party seeking a forfeiture of the right of his opponent [to a transcript] we intend to avoid the possibility that a party will lose this important right by inadvertence or mistake.” Id. In this case, there was no express refusal but, rather, a failure to respond.

Though the Court was sympathetic to “the possible unfairness [to Wife] in this particular case,” it was not willing to replace the bright line rule with a “case-by-case inquiry into the losing party’s subjective intent based on its conduct.” Id. at 11. Parties in Wife’s situation could avoid a situation like this by ensuring that express refusal to pay by the opposing party is on the record.

The Court of Appeals of Georgia recently affirmed a modification of visitation over the appeal by the father/primary custodian. Blackmore v. Blackmore, A11A1277 (2011). In that case, the parties shared joint legal custody of their two children with the father having primary physical custody. Id. at 2. The mother later filed a Petition to Modify Visitation, seeking “more visitation and primary decision-making authority over healthcare issues and the children’s extracurricular activities.” Id. At the recommendation of the guardian ad litem and custody evaluator, the trial court at first limited the mother’s visitation and required that it be supervised. Id. at 3. However, at the final hearing, the trial court removed the visitation restrictions and granted the mother more visitation, while keeping the father as the primary physical custodian. Id. The trial court also “ordered that each parent would make decisions regarding the day-to-day care of the children...while the children were residing with that parent." Id.

The father appealed arguing, among other things, “that the court’s final order amounted to a de facto change in custody, which was impermissible because there were no changes in material circumstances.” Id. at 8. The Court of Appeals of Georgia disagreed with the father, holding that, though “[i]t is true that a trial court may not indirectly change custody by modifying the visitation schedule,” there was no such change in this case. Id. at 9, citing Martin v. Buglioli, 185 Ga. App. 702, 703 (1988); Bullington v. Bullington, 181 Ga. App. 256, 257 (2) (1986). The Court emphasized that the increased visitation provided to the mother/non-custodial parent does not exceed the time of custody provided to the father/custodial parent. Id. at 10. Thus, the increase in visitation time, even when combined with the day-to-day decision making, does not amount to a de facto change in custody. Id.