Atlanta Divorce Attorney Blog

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently affirmed a divorce action where the husband was awarded primary physical custody of the children despite evidence of alleged family violence. Finklea v. Finklea, S11F1804 (2012). At the final hearing in that divorce case, the parties “each testified extensively about acts of family violence committed by the other spouse, which led to multiple police reports filed against each other.” Id. at 2. In its final judgment, the trial court said it was making its decision “[a]fter hearing testimony of the parties and considering all the evidence tendered at trial.” Id. Neither party asked for written findings of fact supporting the custody award. Id. The trial court ultimately awarded primary physical custody to the husband.

The wife appealed, alleging that “in awarding primary physical custody of the parties’ two children to Husband, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to cosider evidence of alleged family violence perpetrated by Husband against her." Id. at 1. The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed, holding that, under the circumstances described above, the trial court did consider evidence of family violence presented at the final hearing. Id. at 3. In addition, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of primary physical custody to the husband. The trial court exercised its discretion in awarding custody to one parent over the other and “[w]here there is any evidence to support the decision of the trial court, this Court cannot say there was an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 3, quoting Haskell v. Haskell, 286 Ga. 112, 112 (2009).

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently reversed a trial court’s decision in a custody modification case because the trial court erroneously relied on evidence from the temporary hearing in making its final custody determination. Vaughn v. Davis, S11A1950 (2012). In that case, the parties had been granted joint legal and physical custody of their children in their divorce action. Neither was required to pay child support to the other, but they were ordered to split the children’s expenses. Id. The mother later filed a motion for change of custody and child support. Id. At the temporary hearing at which both parties appeared pro se, the trial court entered a temporary order awarding primary physical custody to the father, with the visitation to the mother. The mother was also ordered to pay child support to the father. Id.

The mother retained an attorney prior to the final hearing in the case. At the final hearing, the trial court again granted primary physical custody to the father, with visitation for the mother. Id. at 2. After her motion for a new trial was denied, the mother appealed, contending “that the trial court erred by relying on evidence adduced at the temporary hearing.” Id.

The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the mother, citing a case from 2010 which held that “[t]he nature and quality of the evicence presented at a temporary hearing is likely to be different than that which is ultimately presented at the final hearing, and parties should ordinarily expect that only that evidence which their opponent sees fit to offer at the final, more formal hearing will be relied on to support the permanent custody award…Accordingly, we now hold that, absent express notice to the parties, it is error for a trial court to rely on evidence from the temporary hearing in making its final custody determination.” Id. at 2-3, quoting Pace v. Pace, 287 Ga. 899, 901 (2010).

Here, it is clear that the trial court relied on evidence from the temporary hearing in reaching its final custody decision, and “there is no indication that the parties were notified in advance that this was going to happen.” Vaughn at 3. Thus, the trial court’s order must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

In Georgia, as well as around the world, conceiving a child with the use of assisted reproductive technologies can bring up and/or complicate custody issues in a divorce or other family law case. With the ongoing developments in medicine and the reproductive sciences, more couples turn to assisted reproductive technologies to conceive children. Medical and technical advances are providing new ways to become parents which have never been imagined by previous generations. As people turn to options like intrauterine insemination, in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, or freezing sperm, eggs, or embryos for future use, a host of legal questions arise as to ownership, possession and control. For example, does frozen sperm remain the property of the Father or, because it has been frozen and has an intended purpose, is the sperm transformed into property of the Father and Mother?

It is very important to have a written and detailed agreement documenting each party’s intentions prior to entering into any third-party assisted reproduction arrangement. While a couple may enter the process with intentions to stay married or to raise their children together, it is hard to predict whether a couple may separate or be divorced in the future. An agreement should contemplate what would occur in the event the couple separates or gets a divorce. Will someone keep the frozen embryos? Who will be responsible for the costs associated with storing the embryos until future use? For how long will they be stored?

This is just the beginning when it comes to the questions and scenarios that parties must consider prior to entering a third-party assisted reproduction arrangement. If you are considering assisted reproductive technologies or have already used assisted reproductive technologies and are now contemplating a divorce, please contact one of our Atlanta Divorce Attorneys.

By Emily Yu, Associate Attorney, Meriwether & Tharp LLC

In Georgia, even in divorce cases with two fit parents, one parent will be awarded primary physical custody. In a recent divorce case with two fit parents, the trial court awarded primary physical custody of the parties’ two minor children to the Wife, and the Husband appealed. Rowden v. Rowden, S11F0812 (2011).

In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that: “In a contest between parents over the custody of a child [or children], the trial court has very broad discretion, looking always to the best interest of the child[ren], and may award the child[ren] to one even though the other may not be an unfit person to exercise custody or had not otherwise lost the right to custody.” Id. at 2, quoting LaFont v. Rouviere, 283 Ga. 60, 62 (2) (2008). Here, the trial court found that both parents were fit and spent quality time with the children. Id. at 3. However, “Husband did not have a concrete childcare plan for the children, nor did he engage his children in age-appropriate activities with other children that could have assisted in their social development. Wife, on the other hand, got the children involved in summer camps, lived near her own parents (who could help her with the children), and, unlike Husband, planned social events for the children such as birthday parties.” Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia therefore held that the evidence supported the trial court’s decision to award primary physical custody to the mother.

It is important to note that the trial court was not saying that the father was not a fit or good parent. Rather, it relied on the evidence above to tip the scales in favor of the mother for primary physical custody.

With the holiday season upon us, many divorced parents in Georgia will look to their parenting plan for guidance on arranging their holiday schedules. Parenting plans are custody agreements that are submitted jointly or individually by each party in an action that involves child custody in Georgia. Except in those cases where emergency relief is necessary due to family violence, parenting plans are required in all actions in Georgia where child custody is at issue.

A parenting plan may be temporary until a final decree is entered, at which time a permanent parenting plan will go into effect. Under Georgia law, when considering either a joint plan or opposing plans of the parties, the court must make its determination based upon the best interest of the child. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3. The court bases its determination on a number of factors including, but not limited to, the relationship that exists between each parent and the child, and the ability of each parent to provide the child with basic necessities. Id. at a(3).

Parenting plans require that both parties acknowledge and decide on a variety of issues. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1. Holiday visitation is one such issue, and it can be difficult and emotional for parties to come to an agreement because it requires each party to agree to some holidays away from their children. It may never be easy to split time with your child and the other parent, but a successful parenting plan can alleviate tensions between the parties and allow each parent to enjoy time with their child.

If you need help creating a parenting plan, or seek to modify your existing parenting plan, please contact our Atlanta divorce attorneys to assist you in the process.

By Courtney Carpenter, Associate Attorney, Meriwether & Tharp LLC

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently heard a case addressing an alleged modification of a divorce decree in a contempt case. In that case, the parties had joint legal and physical custody of their children. Earle v. Earle, A11A1450 (2011). The father had final decision-making authority over extracurricular activities. Id. at 2. The father later filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the mother refused “to allow the daughter to participate in certain golf tournaments during her custodial time, and for continuing to use a golf instructor for the child that [the father] had previously fired.” Id. at 2-3. After a hearing, the court denied the father’s motion, holding that “the mother could use her custodial time with the children ‘in any way she deems appropriate.’” Id. at 3.

The father appealed, contending that “the trial court improperly modified the original divorce decree” by adding the new language above “which results in a material modification of the decree’s provision regarding his final decision making authority concerning the children’s extracurricular activities.” Id. at 4. The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed with the father, stating that though a court cannot modify a divorce decree in a contempt order, it can interpret and clarify its own orders. Id. at 5. The Court held that, in this case, “the trial court did not impermissibly modify the earlier decree but instead clarified the extent as to which the father’s decision making as to children’s extracurricular activities could encroach upon the mother’s custodial time.” Id.

This case addresses an interesting issue that can come up post-divorce. If you have final decision making regarding extracurricular activities, it now seems that you must take your former spouse’s custodial time into consideration in scheduling these activities. After this case, one probably should not over schedule the children during the times in which they are in the custody of the other parent.

In Georgia, a spouse who has an affair risks the affair playing a large role in the outcome of the divorce case, specifically with the issue of support. First and foremost, adultery is an absolute bar to alimony in Georgia. This means that the person who had the affair is not entitled to alimony, whether they need it or not, and will not be successful on a claim for alimony in court.

On the other hand, adultery does not impact child support as this support belongs to the child, not the parent. Thus, anything relating to child support, such as daycare, medical, and extracurricular expenses for the children, will still be up for discussion and will be shared according to the child support worksheets. It should be noted, however, that adultery can affect child custody, which will determine who pays child support. If a parent has committed adultery in the presence of the children, this parent is acting contrary to the children’s best interests (the standard for determining custody in Georgia), which could result in that parent losing a custody battle and then having the obligation to pay child support.

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently heard a case dealing with supervised visitation that was to be phased out through a transition period. In Sigal v. Sigal, before filing for divorce, the mother first filed a petition for separate maintenance. Sigal v. Sigal, S11F0835 (2011). In the decree from that case, the mother was granted primary custody and the father’s visitation was required to be supervised as a result of his documented drug and alcohol abuse problems. Id. at 2. The mother subsequently filed for divorce and “asserted that all issues regarding custody, visitation and support of the children were fully adjudicated in the decree of separate maintenance.” Id. The father disagreed and sought “reasonable and fair unsupervised visitation” with the children. Id. After hearing testimony from both parties, the trial court orally announced its ruling, holding that the father could have unsupervised visitation provided that he took and passed a drug test within the next 45 days and provided that the unsupervised visitation be phased in over a three month transition period. Id. at 3-4.

For reasons unknown, the final divorce decree was not entered for several months, though the visitation provision was entered nunc pro tunc from the date of the hearing. (This means that the visitation provision went into effect as of the date of the hearing, rather than the date of the final divorce decree). Id. at 4-5. As a result, the three-month transition period had already expired by the time the final decree was entered. Id.

For this reason, the mother appealed, and the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court’s ruling. The Court held that “the nunc pro tunc action as to the gradual transition provision in the decree here did not serve to conform the decree to the truth or the justice of the situation as originally intended by the trial court.” Id. at 7. “Rather, it had the exact opposite effect by eliminating the truth and justice recognized by the trial court…regarding the need of these children for a gradual transition period from supervised to unsupervised visitation with their father.” Id. at 7-8. For this reason, the trial court abused its discretion in making the visitation provision nunc pro tunc.

In Georgia, child custody is determined using the “best interests of the child” standard. OCGA §19-9-3(a)(2). In custody cases where the child is under the age of 11, the court is not required to consider the child’s desires in determining which parent will have custody.

In custody cases where the child is 11, 12 or 13 years of age, “the judge shall consider the desires and educational needs of the child in determining which parent shall have custody.” OCGA §19-9-3(a)(6). The judge still has complete discretion in making the custody determination and, though he must consider the child’s desires, “the child’s desires shall not be controlling.” Id. The determination is still based upon best interests of the child and the child’s desires are a factor to be considered in making this determination.

In custody cases where the child is 14 years of age or older, “the child shall have the right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live.” OCGA §19-9-3(a)(5). The custody selection made by a child in this age group “shall be presumptive unless the parent so selected is determined not to be in the best interests of the child.” Id. Thus, the court will follow the election of the child, unless that election is not in the child’s best interest.

Georgia divorce attorneys are often asked whether a parent’s line of work can impact child custody. In Georgia, child custody is determined using the “best interests of the child” standard. OCGA §19-9-3(a)(2). In determining the best interests of the child, ”the judge may consider any relevant factor.” OCGA §19-9-3(a)(3). This means that anything and everything may impact a custody determination, including a parent’s employment. For example, if you are a truck driver traveling 5 days a week, then it is not practical for you to be the primary physical custodian because you are not home most of the time. This factor will be weighed with all other factors in the determination of custody.

In a recent blog, we emphasized that, when going through a divorce in Georgia, it is important to understand how one holiday may mean more to one parent or family than another. This is particularly the case when it comes to religious holidays and how they are observed. Unless a spouse is particularly religious and strong in their faith, religion is not usually heavily emphasized in a divorce in Georgia. However, for some families, religion and celebrating religious holidays may be particularly important and the impact of religion on divorce must be considered.

For example, orthodox Jewish families may regularly observe the Saturday Sabbath which begins on Friday evenings and continues until Saturday evening. Some families do not use electricity or drive cars during the Sabbath. If this is the case, it is important to contemplate how telephone visitation with minor children will occur on Fridays and Saturdays and, if there is visitation scheduled, how the minor children will be transported to the other parent’s home. Spouses may also need to negotiate other aspects of such religious holidays like dietary restrictions or dress.

In cases where religion is important to one parent or the other, final decision making authority for religion or religious training may be a contentious point. It will be helpful to define what “religious training” means and whether it includes Catholic school, Sunday school, or regularly attending religious services. It is also important to determine what a more religious parent may expect from the other parent. Will both parties be required to observe dietary restrictions or dress provisions when the minor children are with each parent? When religion is an important factor in your divorce, it is better to spend the time having detailed and thorough conversations with the other parent so that clear provisions can be included in your Settlement Agreement.

By Emily Yu, Associate Attorney, Meriwether & Tharp LLC

When divorcing parents are trying to reach an agreement on holiday visitation, the holidays most often discussed are Thanksgiving, Christmas/Winter Break, Easter/Spring Break, Mother’s Day and Father’s Day. This is not an exhaustive list of holidays, however, and there may be some additional special days that you want to discuss when working out a visitation schedule.

For example, if your extended family has a yearly reunion on July 4 each year, it may be important for you to have the children with you on this date every year, or at least as often as possible. In addition, for those families who celebrate the Jewish High Holidays, it may be important to those parents to work out an arrangement to split the holidays each year, or for each parent to have time with the children on each holiday.

Every family is different, and a holiday that is not important to one family may be very important to another, and vice versa. If a certain day means a lot to you and/or your former spouse, make sure you work out the details and include them in your settlement agreement to minimize later disagreements.

Our Atlanta divorce attorneys have recently learned of some interactive websites that may be helpful for parents sharing custody of their children in Georgia. In particular, these websites are a helpful resource for parents who are struggling to communicate effectively or just need help staying organized.

OurFamilyWizard.com, JointParents.com and ParentingTime.net offer a range of features such as a visitation calendar, an expense log, daily journal, photo sharing, and a messaging forum. Visitation calendars allow parents to easily see who has visitation and the children's schedule. The expense log tracks who incurred an expense, the type of expense, the other parent's share, and whether that expense has been paid. Journals, photo sharing, and messaging forums provide a space for parents to communicate to each other about their children's activities, progress in school, etc. All calendars, expenses, photos and messages can be kept and recorded for future reference and may be helpful if there is future litigation. Some of the websites, like OurFamilyWizard.com, provide free professional or third party accounts for attorneys, counselors, teachers, or grandparents.

By Emily Yu, Associate Attorney, Meriwether & Tharp LLC

Last week, I discussed the Gottschalk case, where the father appealed several aspects of the Georgia trial court’s order for supervised visitation. Gottschalk v. Gottschalk, A11A0565 (2011). As mentioned, several of the father’s allegations of error were based upon the trial court’s order prohibiting dissemination of the custody evaluation. After alleging that the trial court erred in prohibiting the parties from showing the custody evaluation to their expert witnesses, the father then contended that, “regardless of the language in the orders about the custody evaluator’s report, prohibiting [the father’s] expert from testifying about the report denied [the father] his due process rights,” because the guardian relied on the report in making custody recommendations. Id. at 18.

The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected this allegation, holding that the father “had notice that the custody evaluator’s report was not to be distributed without permission of the court,” and did not avail himself of the option to obtain the court’s permission that would have allowed him to use the report. Id. at 19. In addition, the mother did not have notice that this expert would be called and moved to exclude his testimony altogether, but the court allowed the father to call the witness. Id. at 20. Thus, his due process rights were not denied. As mentioned in the previous blog, if the father had obtained permission for his expert to review and testify to the custody evaluation, as he had done with other witnesses, his expert would have been able to testify about it and he would have nothing about which to complain.

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently upheld an order for supervised visitation, despite the father's allegations of 17 errors by the trial court. Gottschalk v. Gottschalk, A11A0565 (2011). In that case, the parties consented to joint legal and physical custody of their children in their divorce action, with detailed visitation provisions in the final decree. Id. at 3. About a year later, after the father’s arrest, the mother filed a petition seeking supervised visitation for the father. Id. The trial court appointed a custody evaluator, who was to write a report to be distributed ONLY to the court, guardian ad litem and the parties, except upon the court’s express permission otherwise. Id. at 4. During the hearing, the trial court discovered that the father’s expert witness had received a copy of the custody evaluation, and barred the expert from testifying about it since the father had not received express permission to disclose it to him. Id. at 7. The trial court ultimately granted the petition for supervised visitation, holding, with significant factual support, that the father’s “conduct was potentially dangerous for the children.” Id. at 9. After the father’s motion for a new trial was denied, he appealed.

Several of the father’s allegations of error were based upon the trial court’s order prohibiting dissemination of the custody evaluation. In one enumeration of error, he alleges “the trial court erred in interpreting the court’s prior orders as forbidding the parties from allowing their expert witnesses to review the custody evaluator’s report to testify about problems with the methodology used.” Id. at 17-18. The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the orders were “very clear that the report could be disseminated only to the parties, attorneys, and guardian unless otherwise allowed by the court,” and the language “is not susceptible to any other interpretation.” Id. The Court of Appeals also pointed out that parties consented to the order, and “both sides had previously sought and obtained permission to reveal the contents for the report to specific people.” Id. Thus, the Court was not at all sympathetic to this allegation. If the father had just gone through the proper procedure, his expert likely would have been permitted to review the report and testify about it.

It’s hard to believe that school is about to begin (or already has begun in some counties!) in Georgia. The start of school also means the start of after school and weekend activities. This time of year can be particularly stressful for parents who are going through, or have recently gone through, a divorce, as the family adjusts to visitation with the kids’ new, and likely busier, schedules.

If your divorce is final, your final divorce decree should lay out each parent’s rights as they relate to school and extracurricular activities. In Georgia, the final parenting plan must include language indicating that “both parents will have access to all of the children’s records and information, including but not limited to, education, health, extra-curricular activities, and religious communications.” Thus, even where one parent has primary physical custody, the other parent is also entitled to equal information about the child’s school and extra-curricular activities. If you think you may have an issue getting information from your spouse, it is prudent to contact the school and/or extra-curricular entity to ask them to send you the information directly. This will cut down on any miscommunication.

If your divorce is final, and there is no temporary order addressing custody and visitation in place, we recommend that you speak to your attorney about getting such an order in place, especially if you and your spouse are unable to come to an agreement. This will ensure that both parents get time with the children, and no one misses out on any important school or extracurricular events.

Under Georgia law, both parties in a divorce are required to attend a parenting seminar in Georgia if the parties have children under the age of 18. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.8. Forsyth County (Cumming) and Cherokee County (Ball Ground, Canton, and Woodstock) are part of the 9th judicial district. The August – September 2011 parenting seminar schedule for the 9th judicial district is as follows:

• Gainesville (New Hall County Courthouse, 225 Green Street SE) – Thursday, August 4, 5:00pm – 9:00pm; Thursday, August 18, 5:00pm – 9:00pm; Thursday, September 1, 5:00pm – 9:00pm; Thursday, September 15, 5:00pm – 9:00pm
• Canton (RT Jones Memorial Library, 116 Brown Industrial Parkway) – Saturday, August 13, 10:00am – 2:00pm; Saturday, September 10, 10:00am – 2:00pm
• Clarkesville (North GA Technical College, 1500 Hwy. 197 North) – Wednesday, August 10, 1:00pm – 5:00pm; Wednesday, September 14, 1:00pm – 5:00pm
• Cumming (Hampton Park Library, 5345 Settingdown Road) – Saturday, August 20, 1:00pm – 5:00pm; Saturday, September 17, 1:00pm – 5:00pm
• Ellijay (Gilmer County Library, 268 Calvin Jackson Drive) – Monday, August 8, 1:00pm – 5:00pm; Monday, September 12, 1:00pm – 5:00pm

The cost of the seminar is currently $50.00 per person. There is no pre-registration, but you must pay with money order. You can find additional information about these seminars at 9th Judicial Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution website.

In this age of technology, visitation does not just include when you will physically see your children after going through a divorce in Georgia. Visitation also includes when and how you can communicate with your children during the times in which your former spouse has custody or visitation. For many parents this is a no brainer – the children can speak or otherwise communicate with the other parent as often as they would like. In more adversarial divorces, however, this is not always the case. For a while, it has been common practice in Georgia to include a clause for telephone visitation in a settlement agreement or final divorce decree.

Recently, family law attorneys have been recommending a clause for email visitation as well, once the children are age appropriate. This clause can be as simple stating that the children may communicate with the other parent via email, texting, or any other means of communication. We also recommend that there is language that the emails between parent and child be private and confidential, to cut down on the other parent reading or intercepting the emails. Again, for many parents, email visitation is not an issue. However, if you think that it may be an issue in your situation, be sure to ask for a clause in your settlement agreement or ask the judge to put a clause in your final divorce decree.

If your divorce is final in Georgia, your divorce decree will state who has legal and physical custody of the children. Legal custody deals with decision-making, and physical custody generally reflects with which parent the children will spend most of their time. Often, the major legal custody categories (health, education, religion, and extracurricular activities) are split between the parents, with one parent having final decision-making authority on two categories and the other parent having final decision-making authority on the other two. The divorce decree usually states that the parties both have access to all records and should try to work together but, if they cannot come to an agreement, the final decision-making authority kicks in.

Day-to-day decisions are handled differently, however. In Georgia, a final divorce decree is required to state: “Each parent shall make decisions regarding the day-to-day care of a child while that child is residing with that parent including any emergency decisions affecting the health or safety of a child.” Thus, if a child gets injured while in the custody of the parent who does not have final decision-making on health issues, that parent can still seek treatment for the child. Parents should use their common sense in situations such as this and keep the other parent informed of any major decisions made that affect the children.

When parents are going through, or have gone through, a divorce, one of the hardest adjustments is often learning how to work together to co-parent the children after child custody is determined. Co-parenting includes coordinating your schedules and those of the children, working together for visitation exchange, working out holidays, and making decisions regarding the children.

Sometimes, even something as simple as seeing the other person during a visitation exchange can be complicated. It may be difficult if one or both parents have animosity toward the other, or it may be awkward if a parent is remarried and the new spouse is there. If switching the children at a parent’s house results in an uncomfortable situation, consider switching the location, or possibly having another person present during the exchange. (Make sure this person will not exacerbate the situation!) Some parents meet at a designated store or shopping center. This takes away the opportunity for the parents to be completely alone together, and can lessen the awkwardness for both the parents and the children.

Under Georgia law, both parties in a divorce are required to attend a parenting seminar in Georgia if the parties have children under the age of 18. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.8. Forsyth County (Cumming) and Cherokee County (Ball Ground, Canton, and Woodstock) are part of the 9th judicial district. The July 2011 parenting seminar schedule for the 9th judicial district is as follows:

• Gainesville (New Hall County Courthouse, 225 Green Street SE) – Thursday, July 7 5:00pm – 9:00pm; Thursday, July 21 5:00pm – 9:00pm
• Canton (RT Jones Memorial Library, 116 Brown Industrial Parkway) – Saturday, July 9 10:00am – 2:00pm
• Clarkesville (North GA Technical College, 1500 Hwy. 197 North) – Wednesday, July 13 1:00pm – 5:00pm
• Cumming (Central Park Recreation Center, 2300 Keith Bridge Road) – Saturday, July 23 10:00am – 2:00pm
• Ellijay (Gilmer County Library, 268 Calvin Jackson Drive) – Monday, July 25 1:00pm – 5:00pm

Dates for August and September will be forthcoming. The cost of the seminar is currently $50.00 per person. There is no pre-registration, but you must pay with money order. You can find additional information about these seminars at 9th Judicial Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution website.

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently reversed a trial court's decision regarding a restriction on overnight guests during a parent's visitation time. Ward v. Ward, S11A0437 (2011). In that case, the parties’ Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce awarded primary physical custody of the children to the father, with the mother receiving substantial visitation. Id. About a year after the divorce, the parties each filed modification actions and the divorce decree was amended to include a visitation provision providing that the mother “shall not have any overnight male guests while the minor children are present.” Id.

The mother appealed, arguing that the amended visitation provision was overbroad, and the Supreme Court of Georgia agreed. Id. at 2. Presumably, this provision was included to prohibit the mother from having a boyfriend spend the night, but the Court was moved by the mother’s argument that, as written, the provision “prohibits her from having her father, a brother, a new spouse, or even the children’s father spend the night at her house while the minor children are present.” Id. Generally, “a trial court has discretion to place restrictions on custodial parents’ behavior that will harm their children,” but here, the restriction prohibits the mother from having non-romantic male visitors, which were not shown to be harmful to the children. Id. at 3. Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial court abused its discretion in amending the divorce decree in this manner.

Provisions such as the one addressed in this case are fairly common in divorce decrees. A better way to write this provision would be that the mother shall not have any overnight male guest that is not related by blood or marriage while the minor children are present.

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently heard an appeal regarding final decision making authority in a Georgia divorce decree. Avren v. Garten, S11A0064 (2011). In that case, the parties were divorced, and the final order awarded the father final decision making authority for the child regarding health and medical issues. Id. at 2. The trial court subsequently found the mother in contempt for taking the parties’ minor child to counseling over the father's objection, and the mother appealed. Id.

The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the mother’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in finding her in contempt. The Court specifically noted that “[m]other acknowledged at the contempt hearing that she had taken the child to a therapist that Father disapproved,” despite the fact that the father had final decision making authority on this issue. Id. at 3. These facts provided sufficient evidence “to support the trial court’s determination that Mother willfully disobeyed a prior court order” and, thus, the finding of contempt was upheld. Id.

The Supreme Court of Georgia often hears appeals of custody determinations, though the standard to overturn a trial court's ruling on this issue is very high. In a recent case, the parties’ Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce awarded the parties joint legal custody of their eight-year-old daughter, with the Wife receiving primary physical custody and the Husband receiving visitation. Reed v. Reed, S11A0085 (2011). The Husband appealed, challenging the trial court’s custody determination. Id.

The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the Husband, emphasizing long standing Georgia law that, so long as the trial court used its discretion “to determine solely what is for the best interest of the child and what will best promote the child’s welfare and happiness,” the Court will not interfere. Id. at 1-2; OCGA §19-9-3(a)(2). The Court found that there was “ample evidence” to support the trial court’s custody award, specifically that “...Wife had served as primary caregiver since the child’s birth and had a strong, loving relationship with the child, and that Husband had on occasions both before and during the divorce proceedings exhibited conduct casting doubt on his trustworthiness, truthfulness, and judgment.” Reed, at 2. The Supreme Court of Georgia touched on the Husband’s argument that the trial court “failed to consider the Wife’s anticipated move to North Carolina,” but held that the trial court considered this fact and “did not find it dispositive with regard to the child’s best interests.” Id. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the judgment was affirmed.

With school getting out and summer upon us, it seems appropriate to discuss summer visitation. Whether you are currently going through a divorce, or have already gone through a divorce, summer visitation is something that you and your former spouse (or soon-to-be former spouse) should discuss. Camp and other extracurricular activities can often take up a lot of the children’s time, so it is important that you are on the same page about these activities and how they may impact visitation.

If your divorce is final, you are required to abide by your final divorce decree regarding vsummer visitation. Often, divorce decrees allow each parent to take the children on a vacation for up to two uninterrupted weeks, so long as each parent notifies the other of his/her intent. I recommend that you go back and read your divorce decree to make sure you are clear on your rights and obligations.

If you do not yet have a final divorce decree and there is no temporary order governing custody and visitation for the summer, I highly recommend that you seek to get a temporary agreement in place. There are several reasons for coming to a summer visitation arrangement sooner rather than later: (1) You can make travel plans, if necessary; (2) You can make arrangements for taking time off work or arranging child care/camp during the time you have the children; and (3) You can ensure that both parents will have some time with the children over the summer.

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed long standing law in limiting court ordered visitation to parents and grandparents. Morris v. Morris, A11A0013 (2011). In that legitimation case, the biological mother appealed the legitimation order, not because the trial court granted the legitimation petition, but because the trial court granted visitation rights to the father’s sister. Id.

After the father testified that he wanted his sister “to be available to help him with child visits but not to replace him on the visitations,” the trial court awarded visitation to the father “and/or [the father’s sister],” over the mother’s objection. Id. This essentially amounted to the possibility of separate visitation for the father’s sister since, according to the wording of the order, the father was not required to be there.

The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with the mother that it was error for the trial court to grant these visitation rights. (Interestingly, the father conceded that the trial court erred in this regard.) Id. at 2. Generally, “[t]he right to determine whom the child shall visit and associate with, and when, where, and how often these visits and associations shall take place, is an inseparable and inalienable ingredient of the right of a parent to custody and control of a minor child.” Id. at 2-3. According to Georgia law, only grandparents have the right to sue and obtain for visitation rights. OCGA §19-7-3(c). Though certain other family members may seek custody (OCGA §19-7-1(b.1)), the father’s sister was not doing so. Therefore, since no Georgia law exists to award visitation in this circumstance, the order awarding visitation rights to the father’s sister was vacated.

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently upheld an award of attorney’s fees based upon Wife’s conduct during the divorce litigation that caused the Husband to incur unnecessary attorney’s fees. Abt v. Abt, S11F0670 (2011). In that case, after a temporary hearing, the parties were awarded joint legal custody of their two children, with the Wife being named primary physical custodian. Id. Subsequently, the Wife’s boyfriend moved into the marital residence, and “the children revised their election of custodial parent several times, related in part to wife’s new boyfriend and his residence in the home.” Id. Just prior to the final trial, the wife moved for appointment of a guardian ad litem, and the trial was delayed so a guardian could be appointed “to address the custodial fluctuations of the children.” Id. After the final hearing, the trial court ordered the Wife to pay Husband $14,862.50 in attorney’s fees and the Wife appealed. Id. at 2.

The attorney’s fees were awarded pursuant to OCGA §9-15-14(b), which authorizes “an award of reasonable and necessary attorney fees upon a finding that an action or any part thereof lacked substantial justification, was interposed for delay or harassment, or an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct.” Id. at 3. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the award of attorney’s fees to Husband, as the trial court found that the Wife’s actions during the divorce proceeding “caused the children to vacillate in their respective custodial elections and resulted in the necessity for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the need to conduce emergency hearings, the entry of an order restraining wife from approaching husband’s residence or business location, and the overall expansion of litigation.” Id. at 4. These findings supported the trial court’s holding that wife’s actions unnecessarily expanded the litigation and, thus, there was no error in the award of attorney’s fees. Id.

The 9th Judicial District (Forsyth and Cherokee counties) recently revised its April – June 2011 parenting seminar schedule as follows:

• Gainesville (New Hall County Courthouse, 225 Green Street SE) – Thursday, April 21, 5:00pm – 9:00pm; Thursday, May 5, 5:00pm – 9:00pm; Thursday, May 19, 5:00pm – 9:00pm; Thursday, June 2, 5:00pm – 9:00pm; Thursday, June 16, 5:00pm – 9:00pm
• Dahlonega (North Georgia College and State University, Continuing Education Bldg., Highway 60) –Tuesday, April 19, 9:00am – 1:00pm; Tuesday, May 17, 9:00am – 1:00pm; Wednesday, June 1, 9:00am – 1:00pm
• Blairsville (Haralson Civic Center, 165 Welborn Street) –Monday, May 9, 1:00pm – 5:00pm; Monday, June 6, 1:00pm – 5:00pm
• Clarkesville (North GA Technical College, 1500 Hwy. 197 North) – Wednesday, May 11, 1:00pm – 5:00pm; Wednesday, June 8, 1:00pm – 5:00pm
• Cumming (Hampton Park Library, 5345 Settingdown Road) – Wednesday, April 20, 4:00pm – 8:00pm
• Cumming (Sharon Forks Library, 2820 Old Atlanta Road) – Monday, May 16, 4:00pm – 8:00pm
• Ellijay (Gilmer County Library, 268 Calvin Jackson Drive) – Monday, April 25, 1:00pm – 5:00pm; Monday, May 23, 1:00pm – 5:00pm; Monday, June 13, 1:00pm – 5:00pm
• Canton (RT Jones Memorial Library, 116 Brown Industrial Parkway) – Saturday, April 30, 10:00am – 2:00pm; Saturday, May 21, 10:00am – 2:00pm; Saturday, June 11, 10:00am – 2:00pm

The cost of the seminar is currently $50.00 per person. There is no pre-registration and you must arrive 30 minutes early to register. You can find additional information about these seminars at 9th Judicial Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution website.

Any case in Georgia involving child custody must have a formal parenting plan incorporated into the final decree. OCGA §19-9-1. In addition to the general acknowledgments discussed in the previous blog, there are also several specific things that must be included in the parenting plan:

(A) Where and when a child will be in each parent’s physical care, designating where the child will spend each day of the year;

(B) How holidays, birthdays, vacations, school breaks, and other special occasions will be spent with each parent including the time of day that each event will begin and end;

(C) Transportation arrangements including how the child will be exchanged between the parents, the location of the exchange, how the transportation costs will be paid, and any other matter relating to the child spending time with each parent;

(D) Whether supervision will be needed for any parenting time and, if so, the particulars of the supervision;

(E) An allocation of decision-making authority to one or both of the parents with regard to the child's education, health, extracurricular activities, and religious upbringing, and if the parents agree the matters should be jointly decided, how to resolve a situation in which the parents disagree on resolution; and

(F) What, if any, limitations will exist while one parent has physical custody of the child in terms of the other parent contacting the child and the other parent's right to access education, health, extracurricular activity, and religious information regarding the child.

OCGA §19-9-1(b)(2)(A)-(F). These items give specific guidance to parents as to all the details surrounding custody and visitation in an effort to eliminate confusion or disagreements.

Ideally, the parents will work together to come up with a parenting plan that addresses their unique situation. However, if the parents are unable to agree, each party shall file a proposed parenting plan with the judge, who will make the ultimate decision considering both proposals and the best interests of the child. OCGA §19-9-1(c).

Any case in Georgia involving child custody must have a formal parenting plan incorporated into the final decree. OCGA §19-9-1. There are several requirements for the mandated parenting plans. The parenting plan MUST include:

(A) A recognition that a close and continuing parent-child relationship and continuity in the child's life will be in the child's best interest;

(B) A recognition that the child's needs will change and grow as the child matures and demonstrate that the parents will make an effort to parent that takes this issue into account so that future modifications to the parenting plan are minimized;

(C) A recognition that a parent with physical custody will make day-to-day decisions and emergency decisions while the child is residing with such parent; and

(D) That both parents will have access to all of the child's records and information, including, but not limited to, education, health, extracurricular activities, and religious communications.

OCGA §19-9-1(b)(1)(A)-(D). These acknowledgements force the parents to think through how they will work together in the broader sense to raise their children. These statements must appear in any settlement agreement and/or final judgment and decree. To ensure compliance, it is recommended that the wording of the statute be followed very closely, if not exactly.

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently made an interesting, if not surprising, ruling, denying a parenting time deviation in a joint custody case. Willis v. Willis, S10F1357 (January 24, 2010). In that divorce case, the parties were awarded joint legal and physical custody of their only child, with physical custody alternating weekly. Id. The trial court designated the husband as the non-custodial parent “[s]olely for purposes of calculating child support.” Id. After considering the parties’ incomes and the wife’s payment of the child’s health insurance premiums, the court ordered the husband “to pay monthly child support of $961 to Wife and to divide evenly with Wife the child’s uninsured health-care expenses.” Id. at 2.

The husband appealed, claiming, “the trial court abused its discretion and unjustly enriched Wife” when it did not give him a parenting time deviation, given the joint physical custody. Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the trial court that in order to grant a deviation, the trial court “must find that the application of the presumptive amount of child support would be unjust or inappropriate and that the best interest of the child for whom support is being determined will be served by deviation from the presumptive amount of child support.” Id. at 4, OCGA 19-6-15(c)(2)(E)(iii). The Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s holding that the presumptive amount of child support was not excessive or inadequate, nor did it unjustly enrich the wife, and that a downward deviation would not be in the best interests of the child. Id. at 4.

This case shows that a parenting time deviation is not presumed just because of a shared custody arrangement. There are certain findings necessary for the court to grant this deviation and, without those findings, the deviation will not be granted. This case might ultimately make it a little more difficult for a parent to get a parenting time deviation, but it is not impossible as long as you present the proper evidence to the court – the presumptive amount of child support is unjust or inappropriate, and the child’s best interest will be served by the deviation.

Today in An Atlanta Divorce Attorney’s Thoughts on Celebrity Divorce, I’m going to discuss the brewing custody battle between Halle Berry and Gabriel Aubry. Berry and Aubry have a daughter, Nahla, together, though they were never married. After they broke up last year, it appeared that they were amicably and informally sharing custody of Nahla, but this arrangement has recently transformed into a bitter custody battle. Aubry filed a petition to establish paternity and to have a formal custody arrangement, signaling that the parties are no longer able to work the arrangement out on their own.

According to People Magazine, Berry has stated that she has “'serious concerns' about Nahla’s well-being while in Aubry’s care,” and Aubry has denied these allegations. In a custody battle such as this, courts almost always appoint a Guardian ad Litem to assist in determining custody and it is likely a Guardian will be appointed in this case if the parties are unable to reach a settlement through mediation or otherwise. A Guardian ad Litem represents the child, and conducts interviews with the parties and other people with direct knowledge of the situation to piece through the various allegations. Upon completion of a thorough evaluation, the Guardian will make a custody recommendation to the court that is guided by the child’s best interest.

Unfortunately, even with a Guardian ad Litem, in a bitter custody battle such as this one, the allegations can get ugly (they already have here) and the child often gets dragged into the middle. Berry and Aubry both say they have Nahla’s best interest at heart but it remains to be seen if they will keep her best interest, rather than their anger toward each other, in the forefront of the custody battle.

The court can deviate from the presumptive child support amount calculated by the child support worksheets for several reasons, IF the child support deviation is in the best interest of the child(ren) for whom child support is being determined. OCGA §19-6-15(i)(1)(A). The tenth deviation category under the statute is extraordinary expenses. OCGA §19-6-15(i)(2)(J). Generally, child support is based upon “average child expenses for families given the parents’ combined adjusted income and number of children.” Id. The legislature recognized that expenses for children are highly variable and, thus, included this deviation so that these expenses may be considered on a case-by-case basis. Id. If extraordinary expenses are found, they “shall be prorated between the parents by assigning or deducting credit for actual payments” made for these extraordinary expenses. Id.

There are three types of extraordinary expenses that may be considered:

1. Extraordinary educational expenses – Includes tuition, room and board, lab fees, books, fees, and other reasonable and necessary expenses associated with education OCGA §19-6-15(i)(2)(J)(i). Expenses must be “appropriate to the parent’s financial abilities and to the lifestyle of the child if the parents and the child were living together.” Id.

2. Special expenses incurred for child rearing – Includes summer camp, music/art lessons, extracurricular activities. The basic child support obligation covers average amounts for these expenses, but “when these special expenses exceed 7 percent of the basic child support obligation, then the additional amount of special expenses shall be considered as a deviation to cover the full amount of the special expenses.” OCGA §19-6-15(i)(2)(J)(ii).

3. Extraordinary medical expenses – Includes medical expenses not covered by insurance that cause extreme economic hardship. OCGA §19-6-15(i)(2)(J)(iii).

Georgia courts can deviate from the presumptive child support amount calculated by the child support worksheets for several reasons, IF the child support deviation is in the best interest of the child(ren) for whom child support is being determined. OCGA §19-6-15(i)(1)(A). The ninth deviation category under the statute is Permanency Plan or Foster Care Plan. OCGA §19-6-15(i)(2)(I). This deviation may be considered when the child is in foster care.

Under this deviation, when the child is in the legal custody of a public or private child protection or foster care agency, the court can consider a deviation “if the deviation will assist in accomplishing a permanency plan or foster care plan for the child that has a goal of returning the child to the parent or parents and the parent’s need to establish an adequate household or to otherwise adequately prepare herself or himself for the return of the child clearly justifies a deviation for this purpose.” Id. For example, consider a situation where a child is in the custody of a state agency, and the parent is diligently working two jobs so that he/she can attain a stable residence for the child. The parent may be able to make ends meet, attain a stable residence and accomplish the goals necessary for return of the child to his/her custody, but only if he/she received a downward deviation in child support. In this situation, the court would look at the big picture and end goal, and may grant the deviation under the circumstances.

Georgia courts can deviate from the presumptive child support amount calculated by the child support worksheets for several reasons, IF the child support deviation is in the best interest of the child(ren) for whom child support is being determined. OCGA §19-6-15(i)(1)(A). The eighth deviation category under the statute is mortgage. OCGA §19-6-15(i)(2)(H). This deviation may be considered when the noncustodial parent/child support payor is providing a home for the child. Id.

Specifically, the court may consider a deviation where “the noncustodial parent is providing shelter, such as paying the mortgage of the home, or has provided a home at no cost to the custodial parent in which the child resides.” Id. For example, a noncustodial parent may own several properties, and allow the child and custodial parent to live in one of the properties in which the noncustodial parent does not live. Like many of the other deviations, in this situation, the parent is providing a benefit to the child in addition to his or her child support obligation and, therefore, may ask the court to pay less child support. With the mortgage deviation, the court may deviate by allocating the costs of the home between the parents, or decreasing the noncustodial parent’s child support obligation by “an amount equivalent to such [housing] costs." Id.

The court can deviate from the presumptive child support amount calculated by the child support worksheets for several reasons, IF the child support deviation is in the best interest of the child(ren) for whom child support is being determined. OCGA §19-6-15(i)(1)(A). The sixth deviation category under the statute is travel expenses. OCGA §19-6-15(i)(2)(F). This deviation is included in the statute to cover a situation where the parents live in different cities or states and visitation related travel expenses are substantial for one or both parents.

If parents live in different cities or states, the logistics for visitation can be a little more complicated. If a plane flight is necessary, and the child is too young to fly alone, one parent must fly the child to and from visitation and, thus, there are round trip airline tickets on each end. Even if the distance can be travelled by car, gas has become increasingly expensive. If travel expenses for visitation are found to be substantial, “the court may order the allocation of such costs…by deviation from the presumptive amount of child support, taking into consideration the circumstances of the respective parents as well as which parent moved and the reason for such move.” Id. The court may be more likely to allow a deviation for a parent who moved due to a job or to be closer to family who could help with child care rather than a parent who moved away from his/her children to be closer to a new girlfriend/boyfriend.

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently heard an interesting case regarding self-executing child support provisions in a divorce settlement agreement. In Tanner v. Morris, the parties’ divorce settlement agreement gave the mother primary physical custody and stated that the father was to pay child support to the mother for the three minor children “for so long as each child shall remain in high school and while also living at home with Wife prior to beginning college or other secondary education.” Tanner v. Morris, S10A1227 at 2 (2010) (emphasis added).

Shortly after the divorce was final, the parties’ eldest child began living with the father, and the father ceased making child support payments for that child. Id. The middle child subsequently began living with the father, and the father thereafter ceased making child support payments for that child. Id. at 3. When the father refused the mother’s request for return of the middle child to her custody, the mother filed an action for contempt. Id. The trial court held that the father had child support arrearage for both children, but only held him in contempt for the support for the middle child, since the mother never requested return of the eldest child. Id. The father appealed.

The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the language “while also living at home with Wife” made the child support provision self-executing, meaning that the child support was modifiable without a new order from the court. Id. at 4. Since the Court has previously held self-executing provisions such as this one to be lawful, the Court held that “it was error for the trial court to hold [the father] in contempt for relying on the self-executing provision in the parties’ settlement agreement to reduce his child support obligation when he had [the mother’s] consent to allow the children to live with him." Id. Thus, the portion of the trial court’s judgment as to the arrearage for the eldest child was reversed. Id. at 5. The Court also vacated the arrearage amount for the middle child, holding that “the arrearage amount should be from the time [the father] lost [the mother’s] consent to keep the middle child, rather than the full amount awarded by the trial court." Id.

In this installment of An Atlanta Divorce Attorney’s Thoughts on Celebrity Divorce, I’m going to address the divorce of Charlie Sheen and Brooke Mueller. People magazine recently reported that the parties have each filed for divorce. Sheen is seeking joint legal and physical custody of their twin boys, and Mueller is seeking primary physical custody with visitation rights for Sheen.

Surprisingly, it appears that this divorce might not be as contested as one would imagine, given their history together. Apparently, while separated earlier this year, they entered into an agreement settling matters of child custody, child support and equitable division. It appears that spousal support may still be a contested issue. In addition, it appears that Sheen’s divorce filing differed from the purported agreement on the issue of custody.

If the parties do end up in court with a contested divorce, my guess, based upon their history, is that it won’t be pretty. Both parties have recently been in rehab for substance abuse – a fact the judge would seriously consider in awarding custody. In addition, Sheen was sentenced to domestic violence counseling stemming from their altercation over Christmas last year, and was recently hospitalized after an “incident” at the Plaza Hotel. Each party will likely drag the other through the mud in trying to prove to the judge that he or she should be awarded custody. If this case was in Georgia, the judge would hear all of the evidence and weigh many factors before awarding custody based on the best interests of the children standard.

If you are going through a divorce, or have recently gone through a divorce, the holidays can be a particularly difficult time. When you and your former spouse (or soon-to-be former spouse) have children together, this time of year can be even more challenging for everyone involved as the whole family will have to cope with spending holidays separately.

If your divorce is final, you are required to abide by your final divorce decree regarding who has the children for the holidays. If you do not yet have a final divorce decree and there is no temporary order governing custody and visitation for the holidays, I highly recommend that you seek to get an agreement in place. There are several reasons for coming to a holiday arrangement sooner rather than later: (1) You can make travel plans, if necessary; (2) You can make arrangements for taking time off work or getting child care during the time you have the children when they will be off school; (3) You can ensure that both parents will have some time with the children over the holidays; and (4) The children will know what to expect and may, therefore, be able to cope with the changes a little better.

In making an agreement, you may want to consider our sample holiday visitation ideas.

Final decision-making regarding children and religion can be an important issue for many parents going through a divorce. The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue. In Greene v. Greene, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement in their divorce action, which provided that the parties would have joint legal custody with the mother as the sole physical custodian. Greene v. Greene, A10A1463 (2010). In addition, the mother would have final decision-making authority on all matters related to religion. Id. The parties agreed that “the child would be raised in the Jewish faith, would attend Hebrew school, become Bat Mitzvah and follow other Jewish traditions." Id. at 4. After the father violated this provision of the Settlement Agreement, the mother filed a motion for contempt. The trial court granted the mother’s motion, and the father appealed.

On appeal the father admitted that, in spite of the agreement, he had taken the child to numerous Christian churches, shared Christian prayers with the child, read the Bible to the child, played Christian music for the child, gave the child Christian books and DVDs, and told the child that she was “Jewish on the outside and Christian on the inside.” Id. The father acknowledged that he knew the Settlement Agreement gave the mother final decision making authority on religion, but contended that the trial court’s ruling “restricted his freedom to share his religious beliefs with his child.” Id. at 2.

The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed with the father. The Court held that when the Settlement Agreement is “clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one interpretation as written, the provision’s plain meaning must be strictly enforced.” Id. at 5, quoting Page v. Baylard, 281 Ga. 586, 587 (1) (642 SE2d 14) (2007). In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Court said “the Settlement Agreement is clear that Wife had the right to make the final decisions about the child’s religious upbringing, and the trial court correctly concluded that the Agreement governs.” Id. at 5.

In Georgia, there is a difference between the evidence that can be presented in a temporary hearing versus a final hearing in a divorce case. In Pace v. Pace, after a temporary hearing at which both parties testified, the husband was awarded physical custody of the children and the parties were awarded legal custody. Pace v. Pace, S10F0843 (2010). About a year later, a final hearing was held, at which both parties and multiple witnesses testified, and a Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce was entered, awarding permanent physical and legal custody of the children to the husband. Id. The wife appealed after being denied a new trial.

In its review, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that “the trial court relied substantially on testimony adduced at the temporary hearing in making its determination on permanent custody,” that the parties were not on notice that this testimony would be considered for permanent custody, and that the trial court relied on its “memory and notes” rather than a transcript in reaching its decision. Id. at 2.

The Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in its reliance on evidence from the temporary hearing because an award of temporary custody “differ[s] in its nature and purpose from an award of temporary custody”. Id. at 3, quoting Foster v. Foster, 230 Ga. 658, 660 (1973). Further, temporary orders and final orders are not governed by the same rules of law. Pace, at 3. In a temporary hearing, only the parties and one additional witness for each side may testify. Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.5(A). In addition, minor children cannot testify at temporary hearings. Id. at (B). These rules do not apply at a final hearing. Thus, stated the Court, “the nature and quality of the evidence presented at a temporary hearing is likely to be different than that which is ultimately presented at the final hearing…” Pace, at 4. The Georgia Supreme Court held that “absent express notice to the parties, it is error for a trial court to rely on evidence from the temporary hearing in making its final custody determination.” Id. at 5.

This week in An Atlanta Divorce Attorney’s Thoughts on Celebrity Divorce, I’m going to discuss the well-publicized divorce of Tiger Woods and Elin Nordegren. The scandal surrounding Tiger’s multiple extramarital affairs began around Thanksgiving 2009. For the next several months, it seemed like women with whom he had affairs were coming out of the woodwork and speaking to the media each week. Throughout what must have been a gut wrenching time for Nordegren, she remained tactful, continuing her life as privately as possible, and did not thwart the relationship between Woods and their children.

A lesson to take from Nordegren is, no matter what your spouse has put you through and how angry you are at him/her, put your children first. At a time when she could have easily badmouthed Woods in the media and to their children, possibly ruining their relationship with him, she remained discreet. She only spoke to the media once and, even then, she called Woods a good father and refused to share details of the previous 10 months. Due to her actions, the children will likely have a positive relationship with both of their parents despite the hurt and anger that may exist between the parents.

Under Georgia law, both parties in a divorce are required to attend a parenting seminar if the parties have children under the age of 18. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.8. DeKalb County (Avondale Estates, Chamblee, Decatur, Doraville, Lithonia, and Stone Mountain) offers its Seminar for Divorcing Parents at three different locations in the county. All remaining 2010 seminars will take place in the 1st floor Jury Room of the Dekalb County Courthouse Judicial Tower, located at 556 N. McDonough Street, Decatur, Georgia. The schedule for the remainder of 2010 is as follows:

Friday, September 10, 9:30am – 1:30pm
Friday, September 24, 9:30am – 1:30pm
Monday, October 4, 5:00pm – 9:00pm
Friday, October 22, 9:30am – 1:30pm
Monday, November 8, 5:00pm – 9:00pm
Friday, November 19, 9:30am – 1:30pm
Monday, December 6, 5:00pm – 9:00pm
Friday, December 17, 9:30am – 1:30pm

The cost of the seminar is currently $30.00 per person. Dates and time are subject to change so please check the DeKalb County Seminar for Divorcing Parents website for the most up to date information and for online registration under the divorce tab.

Under Georgia law, both parties in a divorce are required to attend a parenting seminar if the parties have children under the age of 18. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.8. Gwinnett County (Buford, Dacula, Duluth, Lawrenceville, Lilburn, Norcross, Snellville, and Suwanee) offers its Parenting Seminar at the Gwinnett Justice and Administration Center, 75 Langley Drive, Lawrenceville, Georgia 30045. The seminars are held in Conference Room A West Wing on the second floor. The schedule for the remainder of 2010 is as follows:

Weekday seminars from 9:00am – 1:00pm: September 2, September 9, September 23, October 7, October 14, October 28, November 4, November 10, December 2, December 9

Evening seminars from 5:00pm – 9:00pm: September 16, October 21, November 18, December 16

The cost of the seminar is currently $30.00 per person and registration MUST be received prior to the day of the seminar. You can find additional information and register online for these seminars at the Gwinnett County Parenting Seminar website.

Under Georgia law, both parties in a divorce are required to attend a parenting seminar if the parties have children under the age of 18. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.8. Cobb County (Acworth, Austell, Kennesaw, Marietta, Powder Springs and Smyrna) offers its Divorcing Parents Seminar at the Cobb County Superior Court Building (Building D; 6th floor jury assembly room), 30 Waddell Street, Marietta, GA 30090.

Cobb County offers a four-hour weekday seminar (from 8:30 am to 1:00 pm) or two two-hour evening sessions (from 7:00 pm to 9:00 pm). The schedule for the remainder of 2010 is as follows:

Thursday morning classes (8:30am – 1:00pm): September 2, September 16, October 7, October 21, November 4, November 18, December 2, December 16

Monday evening classes (7:00pm – 9:00pm): September 13 AND 20, October 11 AND 18, November 8 AND 15, December 13 AND 20

The cost of the seminar is currently $30.00 per person. You can find additional information and register online for these seminars at the Cobb County Divorcing Parents Seminar website.

Under Georgia law, both parties in a divorce are required to attend a parenting seminar if the parties have children under the age of 18. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.8. Forsyth County (Cumming) and Cherokee County (Ball Ground, Canton, and Woodstock) are part of the 9th judicial district. All of the counties in this 9th judicial district work jointly to offer their seminar for divorcing parents throughout the judicial district.

The schedule for September 2010 is as follows:
• Gainesville (New Hall County Courthouse, 225 Green Street SE) – Thursday, September 2, 5:00pm – 9:00pm; Thursday, September 16, 5:00pm – 9:00pm
• Dahlonega (North Georgia College and State University, Continuing Education Bldg., Highway 60) – Wednesday, September 8, 9:00am – 1:00pm
• Blairsville (Haralson Civic Center, 165 Welborn Street) – Monday, September 13, 9:00am – 1:00pm
• Clarkesville (North GA Technical College, 1500 Hwy. 197 North) – Tuesday, September 14, 1:00pm – 5:00pm
• Woodstock (Woodstock Public Library, 7735 Main Street) – Saturday, September 18, 10:00am – 2:00pm
• Ellijay (Gilmer County Library, 268 Calvin Jackson Drive) – Monday, September, 20 1:00pm – 5:00pm
• Cumming (First Baptist Church Cumming, Kids Town Building, 1597 Sawnee Drive) – Saturday, September 25, 10:00am – 2:00pm

The cost of the seminar is currently $50.00 per person. There is no pre-registration. You can find additional information about these seminars at 9th Judicial Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution website.

Under Georgia law, both parties in a divorce are required to attend a parenting seminar if the parties have children under the age of 18. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.8. Fulton County (Alpharetta, Atlanta, Johns Creek, Milton, Roswell) offers its Family in Transition seminar at three different locations in the county. The following is a list of locations and schedule of seminars for the rest of the year:

• Saturday morning seminar once per month from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. at the Downtown Justice Center Building located at 160 Pryor Street, S.W., Courtroom G33, Atlanta, Georgia. Remaining 2010 dates – September 18, October 16, November 13, and December 18.
• Weekday morning seminar once per month from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. at the South Fulton Service Center located at 5600 Stonewall Tell Road, College Park, Georgia in the auditorium. Remaining 2010 dates – August 31, September 21, October 19, November 16, and December 21.
• Weekday evening seminar once per month from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. at the Dorothy Benson Senior Multipurpose Complex located at 6500 Vernon Woods, Drive, Building B, Sandy Springs, Georgia. Remaining 2010 dates – September 9, October 7, November 4, and December 2.

Please note that both the South Fulton Service Center and the Dorothy Benson Senior Multipurpose Complex locations require pre-registration. The cost of the seminar is currently $30.00 per person. You can find additional information about these seminars at Fulton County Families in Transition program website.

When one thinks of custody and visitation in a divorce case, the first thing that most likely comes to mind is: “When will I see my children?” An important aspect of visitation is not only when you will see your children, but also when you will be able to speak to them during the times in which your former spouse has custody/visitation. For many parents this is a no brainer – the children can speak to the other parent as often as they would like. In more adversarial divorces, however, this is not always the case. Sometimes one parent may feel that the other parent calls too often, disrupting his/her visitation or custodial time, or calls at inopportune times, when the children are doing homework or asleep.

Our family law firm recommends putting a clause in your settlement agreement addressing telephone visitation. It can be as simple as stating that the children may call the other parent at any time, but the parents may only once per day. It may also address issues such as one parent eavesdropping while the child(ren) is speaking to the other parent.

If you are unable to settle your divorce case and you believe telephone visitation may be an issue with your former spouse, be sure to bring it up to the Judge so that he/she may rule on it in the Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce and your rights will be protected.

As Atlanta divorce attorneys, we are often confronted with questions from parents who want to know more about joint physical custody and legal custody of their children. In order to answer these questions, further investigation is usually required on our end to discover exactly what the parent means by “joint custody.”

In Georgia, there are two aspects to custody: legal custody and physical custody. Legal custody refers to which parent has the right to make decisions concerning the care and welfare of the child. Physical custody refers to where the child will live on a daily basis. Absent serious misconduct by one of the parties, it is nearly routine in Atlanta child custody and divorce cases for the parties to be awarded joint legal custody of the children. This means that both parties are entitled to be made aware of all issues affecting the children’s welfare and that the parties must confer in good faith to try to reach an agreement regarding any major decisions affecting the children. Where the parties are granted joint legal custody, the court will also designate a mechanism for settling any disagreements between the parents (mediation, tiebreaking authority, etc.).

Joint physical custody is a different matter altogether. Many parents use the term “joint custody” when referring to the concept of 50/50 physical custody—an arrangement where the child spends equal amounts of time with each parent. This type of arrangement is most often set up so that the parents alternate week long periods with the child. There are many benefits to this type of custody arrangement, including giving the child the opportunity to build ongoing and lasting bonds with each parent. From a financial standpoint, it may also eliminate the need for either party to pay child support. If the parents cannot agree regarding joint custody, the Court will order that custody be awarded based upon the best interests of the child or children. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3.

As Atlanta divorce attorneys, we are often asked about the right way to tell children that you and your spouse are getting a divorce. A divorce is a very difficult process to go through and, often times, it is toughest on the children who may struggle to understand why their family is changing, and may feel like their family is falling apart. Generally, there is no “right” way to tell the children, as every family is different and the reasons for the divorce can vary greatly. The important thing is to make the children understand that, though you and your spouse are separating, you both love them and will always be there for them. Depending on the ages of your children, it may also be helpful for the children to understand how the future will work – when they will see the parent who is moving out, who will take them to school, where they will live, etc. However you and your spouse choose to break the news to the children, do not let the conversation turn into finger pointing or bashing the other person. This will only make the whole process more difficult on the children, and will make for a much more acrimonious divorce.

Paternity testing during a divorce case is not extremely common, but this issue does arise. The Georgia Court of Appeals recently affirmed a trial court’s denial of a mother’s motion to compel paternity testing of her husband. Williamson v. Williamson, 302 Ga. App. 115 (2010). In that divorce case, the wife alleged that the child born during the marriage might not be the biological child of the father and requested paternity testing. Id. at 116. After a temporary hearing in which the parties were awarded joint legal custody, the wife’s attorney sent a letter to the husband’s attorney confirming the parties’ agreement that paternity was no longer an issue. Id. Subsequently, the wife retained a new attorney and filed a motion requesting a paternity test, which the husband opposed. Id. The child’s guardian ad litem testified that a paternity test would not be in the child’s best interest and the court denied the wife’s motion. Id.

In her appeal, the wife alleges “she is not precluded from contesting paternity.” Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with her, stating neither the purported agreement nor the temporary order determined the issue on a final basis as there was not yet a final order in the case. Id. at 177.

However, even the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the wife had the right to contest paternity, it agreed with the trial court’s denial of her motion, which was based on the “best interest of the child” standard. Id. The wife had a huge hurdle to overcome since “[a]ll children born in wedlock are deemed under law to be legitimate.” Id. Further, “[t]he public policy favoring the presumption of a child’s legitimacy is one of the most firmly-established and persuasive precepts known in law.” Id., quoting Baker v. Baker, 376 Ga. 778, 779 (1) (582 SE2d 102) (2003). In affirming the denial of the wife’s motion to compel paternity testing, the Court of Appeals followed established Georgia law and held, “…even when the child's legal father may not be the biological father, a mother who wishes to delegitimate her child is not automatically entitled to compel the legal father to submit to genetic paternity testing but must first come forward with evidence sufficient to show that delegitimating the child is in the child's best interest. The record in this case contains no such threshold showing.” Williamson, 302 Ga. App. at 118.

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently affirmed a case from Gwinnett County Superior Court regarding relocation and child custody. Almon-Davis v. Davis, 286 Ga. 456 (2010). In that divorce case, both parties requested primary physical custody of their three minor sons. At the request of the husband, the court appointed a Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) to investigate and make a custody recommendation. Id. at 457. After conducting his investigation, the GAL recommended that the father, who was living in Denver at the time, have primary physical custody, and the trial court entered a final judgment and decree of divorce to this effect. Id.

The mother appealed, contending “the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the GAL's report and recommendation… without considering the impact on the children of the Husband's out-of-state move.” Id. The Georiga Supreme Court disagreed, quoting a seminal relocation case, which states: “When exercising its discretion in relocation cases, as in all child custody cases, the trial court must consider the best interests of the child and cannot apply a bright-line test…[T]he primary consideration of the trial court in deciding custody matters must be directed to the best interests of the child involved, that all other rights are secondary, and that any determination of the best interests of the child must be made on a case-by-case basis. This analysis forbids the presumption that a relocating custodial parent will always lose custody and, conversely, forbids any presumption in favor of relocation.” Id., quoting Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445 (2003). The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the transcript and found that the trial court’s consideration of the father’s move “in regard to the children’s welfare and its pragmatic consequences were pivotal” in its custody determinations. Almon-Davis at 458.

Thus, in relocation cases, there is not a presumption that someone will win or lose custody due to a party moving out of the city or state. The court will always look at the specific facts of the case and determine the best interests of the children involved.

When presenting your divorce, custody modification, child support modification, or other family law case to the trial court, it is imperative that your Atlanta divorce attorney presents all relevant evidence in your case. The Supreme Court of Georgia recently denied an appeal by a father in a divorce case who attempted to present evidence in his appellate brief that he did not present at his hearing in front of the Dekalb County trial court. Bankston v. Lachman, 286 Ga. 459 (2010). In that divorce case, the trial court awarded primary physical custody of the parties’ two-year-old daughter to the mother and awarded visitation to the father “for four hours each weekend until the child begins kindergarten full time,” at which point overnight visitation would begin. Id. at 459. Though the father requested overnight visitation to begin immediately, the trial court denied his request, explaining that “it believed young children should not spend long periods and weekends with non-custodial parents…[b]ased on everything [the court] had read and talked to about child development experts…” Id. at 460.

The father appealed the trial court’s denial of additional visitation arguing that “the trial court is out of sync with current opinion about the need to establish a firm parental bond between a child and his or her non-custodial parent,” and referencing two models recommending “that children have more visitation time, including overnight visits, with non-custodial parents, beginning at an early age, and increasing as the child grows older.” Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia pointed out, however, “the record does not reflect that that these models were presented to the trial court; nor does it show that trial counsel made the argument which husband asserts on appeal.” Id. Thus, these arguments could not be relied upon on appeal. The father had to prove that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the evidence presented to it, and this the father could not do.

Recently, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the enforcement of a divorce settlement agreement over the wife/mother's objection. In that case, the father filed for divorce and sought legal and physical custody of the parties’ children. Martinez v. Martinez, 301 Ga. App. 330 (2009). While the divorce proceedings remained pending, the father filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. He contended that the parties had reached the agreement wherein he would be the primary custodial parent and the mother would have visitation rights. Id. The trial court granted the father’s motion and entered a “Final Order on Custody and Visitation” in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement. Id.

The mother appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in enforcing the settlement agreement “because she did not assent to the terms of the settlement and lacked capacity to contract at the time in question due to her medical condition,” and argued that the trial court “refused to receive any evidence from the parties” at the hearing on the father’s motion. Id. at 332. The mother’s allegations regarding evidence at the hearing, however, were disputed by the father and inconsistent with the trial court’s order on the motion. The Georgia Court of Appeals, therefore, affirmed, citing well established case law stating that “'[i]n order for the appellate court to determine whether the judgment appealed from was erroneous, it is the duty of the appellant to include in the record those items which will enable the appellate court to perform an objective review of the evidence and proceedings.'" Atwood v. Southeast Bedding Co., 236 Ga. App. 116 (1) (511 S.E.2d 232) (1999). Id. at 332-333. Further, "'where the proof necessary for determination of the issues on appeal is omitted from the record, an appellate court must assume that the judgment below was correct and affirm.'" Enchanted Valley RV Park Resort v. Weese, 241 Ga. App. 415, 417 (1) (c) (526 SE2d 124) (1999). Id. Because there was no transcript or other evidence in the record on appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals was bound to presume that the trial court was correct.

A judge can sometimes consider the child's choice in making a custody decision. In any contested custody case, the judge hearing and deciding the issue of custody has a duty “to exercise discretion to look to and determine solely what is for the best interest of the child and what will best promote the child's welfare and happiness and to make his or her award accordingly.” O.C.G.A. 19-9-3(a)(2). A factor that the judge will consider, as appropriate, is the child’s election as to which parent he would prefer to live.

In a custody case in which the child is 14 or older, “the child shall have the right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live,” and “[t]he child's selection for purposes of custody shall be presumptive unless the parent so selected is determined [by the judge] not to be in the best interests of the child.” O.C.G.A. 19-9-3(a)(5).

In a contested custody case in which the child is between 11 and 14 years of age, “the judge shall consider the desires and educational needs of the child in determining which parent shall have custody,” and “shall have complete discretion in making this determination.” O.C.G.A. 19-9-3(a)(6). For this age group, “the child's desires shall not be controlling.” The judge is to consider the child’s desires and has discretion in how to do so, but “the best interests of the child standard shall be controlling.” O.C.G.A. 19-9-3(a)(6).

There are two kids of custody: physical custody and legal custody. Legal custody has to do with decision making regarding the children, and parents commonly share joint legal custody. Generally, with joint legal custody, day to day decisions are made by the parent with whom the children are at the time the decision is to be made. For example, if a mother has primary physical custody, but the children are with their father for the weekend, then the father is entitled to make the day to day decisions that are needed or desired during that weekend.

Decisions concerning education, health, religion and extracurricular activities are frequently treated differently. These decisions are generally considered “major decisions” which are to be discussed and agreed to by both parents. If the parents cannot agree, one parent gets ultimate decision making authority. For example, one parent could get final decision making authority for all major decisions, or the parents could split final decision making authority with one parent getting health and religion and the other parent getting education and extracurricular activities.

In discussing a visitation arrangement with your soon to be ex-spouse, it is important to address your child’s birthday. Unfortunately, following a divorce, many parents do not have a relationship that would allow them to celebrate the child’s birthday together so they have to somehow share this important day in their child’s life. One option is for the parents to alternate years, with one parent having the child on his/her birthday in even years and the other parent having the child on his/her birthday in odd years. Another option is to split the day between the parents. For example, the child could spend the night with one parent on the night before his/her birthday and stay with that parent through lunchtime. The other parent would then have the child for the afternoon and evening of his/her birthday. This way, each parent gets quality time with the child on his/her birthday to have a party or otherwise celebrate with them.

“Standard visitation” works well for some parents, but it may not be realistic for your family. In coming up with a visitation schedule with your spouse, it is important to consider the special circumstances in your family’s lives, such as the following:

Work commitments – Do you or does your spouse travel during the week? If so, weeknight visitation may not work for the travelling parent. Do you or does your spouse work late during the week? In this situation, an overnight during the week, rather than just dinner, may allow you to keep your work commitments while spending some quality time with your children during the week.

Children’s extracurricular activities – Do your children participate in extracurricular activities? Is it appropriate for parents to attend and watch the activity (ex: baseball practice, cheerleading practice)? Will you and your spouse both attend these activities or will you alternate? Perhaps the noncustodial parent can have dinner before or after the extracurricular activity to give him/her additional time. If the activities occur on weekends, you might be able to see your children at these activities even when it is not your weekend.

Holidays are special times for most families and one of the most difficult things for divorcing parents to come to terms with is the fact that they will not be spending all of the holidays with their children every year after the divorce. This can be difficult for the children as well as the parents so it is important to create a schedule where each parent has significant time with the children during the holidays.

The following is an example of a holiday visitation schedule that has worked for many parents:

In even numbered years, the Father has Thanksgiving and the second week of Christmas Vacation/Winter Break (beginning the afternoon of Christmas Day), while the Mother has Easter/Spring Break and the first week of Christmas Vacation/Winter Break (ending the afternoon of Christmas Day). In odd numbered years, the Father has Easter/Spring Break and the first week of Christmas Vacation/Winter Break (ending the afternoon of Christmas Day), while the Mother has Thanksgiving and the second week of Christmas Vacation/Winter Break (beginning the afternoon of Christmas Day). The Mother has Mother’s Day every year, and the Father has Father’s Day every year. Any holiday that falls on a Monday (i.e. Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, Memorial Day, Labor Day) will belong to the parent who has the children the preceding weekend.

If you are going through a divorce and you and your spouse have children together, an inevitable question will be: how often will I see my children? It is most common for one parent to have primary physical custody with the other parent having secondary physical custody and visitation. In discussing the custody and visitation arrangement with your spouse or divorce attorney, you will likely hear the term “standard visitation.”

“Standard visitation” is generally every other weekend with one overnight during the week in which the non-custodial parent does not have weekend visitation. Standard visitation includes an equal split of all holidays. Each parent generally has half of the holidays each year with the holidays rotating every other year. For example, one parent will have Thanksgiving with the children in even numbered years and the other parent will have Thanksgiving with the children in odd numbered years. In addition, with standard visitation, each parent generally has blocks of extended time (2-3 weeks) during the summer for vacations with the children.

Our divorce law firm likes to use “standard visitation” as a starting point for custody and visitation discussions as the “standard visitation” outlined above does not work for all families. Some families want different holidays addressed while work commitments may keep some parents from having overnights with the children during the week. Whatever your family’s situation, it is important to find a visitation schedule that works well for both parents as well as the children.

If you are involved in a contested custody case in Georgia, chances are that a Guardian ad Litem has been appointed in your case. Over the course of the next several blogs, we will discuss several do’s and don’ts concerning how to interact with the Guardian to hopefully achieve a favorable recommendation from him or her in your Georgia contested custody case.

Since the Guardian’s ultimate recommendation is given a tremendous amount of weight by the Court, it is important that you do not do the following things:

1. Do not pressure the children’s teachers, counselors, or day care providers to tell the Guardian what a great person you are.
2. Do not ask the Guardian for his or her decision, because it will be presented in a report.
3. Do not talk to the children about what they are going to say to the Guardian.
4. Do not constantly belittle the other party, because it can back-fire against you. You could be accused of parental alienation. If, however, you have some documentary information that could help the Guardian make a decision, you can provide that to him or her, after having your custody lawyer review it.
5. Do not call, mail or e-mail the Guardian on a daily basis.
6. Do not try to pressure any psychologist that the children may be seeing.
7. Do not try to control the Guardian’s investigation. Guardian’s in contested custody cases in Georgia are usually well trained and versed in what to look for in order to make a recommendation on whom should have custody. If the other party claims you are controlling, you will only be proving their case.

On March 23, 2009, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s denial of the wife’s motion for new trial in her divorce action in Rembert v. Rembert (S08F1582). Specifically, the wife alleged that the trial court erred in granting final decision making authority to the husband, who was the primary physical custodian of the parties’ children, and in awarding primary physical custody to the husband.

In regard to decision making, the wife argued that the parties did not truly have joint legal custody because the husband had final decision making authority. The Supreme Court disagreed, reaffirming a prior holding that the language of the statute governing legal custody “clearly vests in the trial court discretion to decide which parent should be empowered to make final decisions where the parents are unable to agree.” Citing Frazier v. Frazier, 280 Ga. 687, 690 (2006). As the primary physical custodian, it was appropriate that the father had final decision making authority in the likely event that the parties would not agree.

In regard to primary physical custody, the Supreme Court held that it would not disturb the trial court’s judgment awarding custody to the father, who had a stable home and a job with a regular schedule, instead of the mother, who was dating a married man, was a full time student with substantial debt, and had threatened the life of a neighbor.

Simply put, joint custody means that both parents share equal input and/or spend equal amount of time with the child/children. Sole custody is essentially the opposite – when only one parent has the decision making power and the child or children live almost all of the time with that one parent. Custody is actually broken into two categories (physical and legal) and then labeled joint or sole within each category. Physical custody describes where a child lives most of the time and what parent will have visitation, whereas legal custody describes access to records and major decisions such as to schooling, religion, extracurricular activities and non-emergency health procedures.

It is most common to see joint custody in the category of legal custody. Joint legal custody means that both parents have input and should be involved in major decisions. Per O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1, (Georgia parenting plan law) there must be a designated tiebreaker or final decision maker if the parties cannot agree (usually the primary physical custodian). This prevents the parties from needing the Court’s intervention every time there is no agreement on any one issue.

In the category of physical custody, the parties must designate a primary physical custodian and typically do not label physical custody under the “sole vs. joint” designation. The primary physical custodian is the person the child/children live with most of the time and the noncustodial parent has visitation or parenting time. According to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (Georgia child support law), even if the parties share equal amount of time with the child/children, the Court must still designate a primary custodian.

Continue reading "Child Custody: Joint Custody vs Sole Custody in Georgia" »

On March 13, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s termination of a father’s parental rights in In the Interest of D.F. (A08A2371). The father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of his parental misconduct or inability, or that termination of parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the father, holding that “[t]he evidence authorized the juvenile court to find that although the father has not engaged in any abuse or intentional misconduct whatsoever toward his children, and although he has made a sincere and food faith effort to obtain reunification with the children by meeting his parental responsibilities, his mental infirmities simply render him incapable of parenting the children without the full-time assistance that is unavailable to him.” The Court, thus, found that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

On February 10, 2009, in Hall v. Wellborn (A08A1800), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a mother’s Petition to Enforce Custody due to lack of jurisdiction. In December 2003, the mother divorced her former husband and was awarded custody of the minor child who, through paternity testing, was found not to be the child of the former husband. Shortly thereafter, the mother and child moved to Florida where the child’s biological father lived. The father filed a paternity action in Florida seeking sole custody and was awarded primary physical custody of the child.

Shortly thereafter, the mother filed an action in Georgia seeking to enforce the original Georgia custody Order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of this action because the Georgia court had lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Under the UCCJEA, a Georgia court that makes an initial child custody determination maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over subsequent custody matters except when neither the child nor the child’s parents have a significant connection to the state, or when neither the child nor the child’s parents presently reside in the state. Thus, Georgia lost jurisdiction and Florida was the proper state in which to bring this custody action.

On February 23, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Dekalb county juvenile court’s deprivation ruling in In the Interest of Z.D. (A09A0487). The Dekalb juvenile court based its deprivation finding on the following evidence: (1) one child was punished for bedwetting by “either sitting on the toilet for prolonged periods of time or being made to sit in cold bath water;” (2) the father did not seek medical treatment for the children’s extremely unusual eating behaviors and, instead, beat the children with a belt if they ate school cafeteria food; (3) the father refused to agree to a home visit; (4) the father tried to withdraw the children from school after reports of suspected abuse; and (5) the father did not follow the DFCS safety plan. Based on the above, the Court of Appeals found that the deprivation finding by the juvenile court was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

On February 23, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Dekalb county juvenile court’s deprivation ruling in In the Interest of N.H. (A08A1759). During the course of DFCS’ investigation of a teenage mother and her child which raised significant concerns, the DFCS case worker secured the services of a parenting support company to instruct the mother on what to feed infants and, generally, how to care for infants. During the parenting specialist’s visit to the home, she noted that the mother fed the infant inappropriate food despite instruction that it was inappropriate. As a result of the investigation, the juvenile court found that the mother “had intellectual limitations evidenced by her continued improper feeding of the child.” Despite the mother’s objection to the deprivation finding because the parenting specialist assigned by DFCS only visited the home once, the Court of Appeals found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of deprivation.

On January 30, 2009, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s award of custody to the child’s maternal grandmother instead of her father. In Galtieri v. O’Dell (A08A1822), the biological father, who had legitimated the child, contended that the trial court erred in its determination because it failed to find that awarding custody to him would harm the child.

The Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the trial court’s ruling, stating that “it is clear that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal analysis for determining whether custody should be awarded to…the maternal grandmother, rather than…the biological father.” Specifically, the Court pointed to O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1), which establishes a rebuttable presumption in custody disputes between a biological parent and a third party relative that it is in the child’s best interest to award custody to the parent. To win custody, the third party relative must show by clear and convincing evidence that awarding custody to the parent would harm the child. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s statement that “from the personal experience of the court…it would be detrimental to the child to move from Georgia” was insufficient to meet this standard.

In In the Interest of R.J.M. (A08A1919), a mother appealed the Order of the Fulton county juvenile court sustaining a petition for deprivation to which she stipulated and which keeps the child in the custody of Fulton county DFCS. After the minor child was sexually abused by her father, DFCS filed a Petition for Deprivation and the child was removed from the home. Subsequently, an Amended Petition for Deprivation was filed, wherein the mother stipulated that the child was deprived, and the parties submitted a proposed Protective Order to the Judge that would allow the child to remain living with her mother. The court reviewed the evidence and the proposed Protective Order, but decided not to return custody to the mother.

The mother appealed, contending that she stipulated to the deprivation only because the agreement was for the child to be returned to her. On February 10, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the juvenile court, holding that “[h]ad the juvenile court merely followed the parties’ recommended disposition despite reservations it had about immediately returning R.J.M. to the mother, the juvenile court would have acted contrary to its fundamental obligation in deprivation proceedings to protect the welfare of the child.”

On January 26, 2009, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued a ruling in Amerson v. Vandiver (S08A1707) regarding a Father’s agreement to termination of his parental rights in a divorce action. In March 2004, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in their divorce action wherein the Mother would have sole, permanent custody of the children and the Father agreed to the termination of his parental rights. Four years later, the Father moved to set aside the Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce alleging that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights.

After the superior court agreed with the Father and set aside the part of the judgment terminating his parental rights, the Mother appealed. The Supreme Court of Georgia pointed out that the juvenile courts, not the superior court, have sole jurisdiction for terminating parental rights, except in the case of adoption proceedings. Nonetheless, the Court went on to say that “[t]he stability of the family and of society demands that one who intends to attack an apparently valid decree of divorce should proceed with the utmost promptness.” The Court reversed the superior court’s ruling and held that the Father’s acts of invoking superior court jurisdiction for his divorce and entering into a settlement agreement which the superior court incorporated into its final decree, coupled with the Father’s four year delay in trying to set the decree aside, prevented him from attacking the agreement.

Adultery on the part of one spouse can affect many aspects of a divorce in Georgia, including alimony, equitable distribution, and even child custody. If a spouse’s adultery was the cause of the divorce, the adulterous party is barred from receiving alimony. Thus, if you can prove that your spouse committed adultery and that the adultery caused the separation; your spouse will not be successful on an alimony claim in Court.

Alimony also comes into play in equitable distribution. Generally, equitable distribution results in splitting the marital estate 50/50, unless there is a reason to give one spouse a greater portion of the marital estate. One reason to give one spouse a disproportionate amount of the marital estate is the bad conduct of the other party, which can include adultery. If an adulterous spouse committed egregious adultery in the presence of the other spouse and/or children, this conduct may result in an unequal split of the marital estate. Similarly, if the adulterous spouse spent substantial marital funds on his or her paramour, the other spouse could get a disproportionate amount of the marital estate to make up the difference and even punish the adulterous spouse.

Alimony can also affect child custody. In determining child custody, the Court is primarily concerned with the best interests of the children. If a parent has committed adultery in the presence of the children and brings his or her paramour around the children, this parent is acting contrary to the children’s best interests, which could result in that parent losing a custody battle.

On November 17, 2008, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed a Juvenile Court’s finding of deprivation under Georgia law and the removal of the child from her parents’ custody. The trial court specifically held that the child was deprived because the child was sexually abused by her Father and because the Mother failed to protect the child from this abuse.

In In the Interest of B.H. (A08A1102), the Georgia Court of Appeals stressed that, in reviewing a judgment determining that child is deprived, “we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the child was deprived.” Citing In the Interest of S.S., 232 Ga. App. 287, 289 (1998). Using this standard, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of deprivation as to the Father, referring to testimony of another child into the house as to the abuse perpetrated by the Father and holding that a rational trier of fact could have found deprivation by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals applied the same standard and reasoning to the deprivation finding against the Mother, referring to specific evidence that the Mother had “manipulated [the child] to ensure the return of the father to the home without regard to whether he had sexually abused the child.”

As an Atlanta divorce lawyer, our law firm is often confronted with dealing with issues of adultery as they related to a divorce. In Georgia, adultery on the part of one spouse can affect many aspects of a divorce proceeding, including alimony, equitable distribution, and even child custody. In order to get to the point that adultery will affect a divorce case, you must prove the adultery, which can be very difficult. Since there is rarely direct proof of adultery, most times it must be proved by circumstantial evidence.

If you and your spouse share cell phone accounts, look at the itemized statements to see if there are substantial calls to a certain number. If you share an email address, you can look at incoming and outgoing emails. If you do not share phone or email accounts, we do not recommend breaking into your spouse’s account if he or she has not given you access, as this could be a criminal violation and the resulting information will likely be inadmissible in Court.

Once a divorce case is filed, however, you will be able to obtain information from your spouse through discovery that may provide evidence of his or her adultery. You can request anything that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, which includes phone records, emails, other correspondence, bank statements, and credit card statements. Phone records may show numerous calls to a paramour. Emails may show correspondence between your spouse and a paramour. Bank and credit card statements may show evidence of substantial funds spent on flowers, hotels, and other gifts that you did not receive.

Continue reading "How can I prove my spouse’s adultery? " »

In Rumley-Miawama v. Miawama (S08F1541), the Supreme Court of Georgia heard a Wife’s appeal from the judgment in her divorce case. The Wife was unhappy with the visitation, child support and equitable division of property portions of the trial court’s judgment.

In regard to child support, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision not to apply a deviation from the child support guidelines for equal parenting time and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing not to apply this deviation. The Supreme Court pointed out that the trial court did use its discretion to give the Wife a deviation for travel expenses.

The Supreme Court of Georgia did agree with the Wife that the trial court erred in including a self-executing change of visitation provision in its judgments. The visitation portion of the judgment, which takes effect if Wife moves out of state and significantly limits her visitation, was reversed, as the Supreme Court held that it failed to reflect consideration of the best interests of the children, which is of paramount importance in Georgia.

Continue reading "Georgia Case Law Update – Visitation, Child Support, Marital Property " »

Our final blog entry in our Atlanta Divorce Lawyers Guide to Divorce and Family Law Cases in Fulton County, Georgia is in regards to the Fulton County’s Guardian Ad Litem program. A Guardian Ad Litem is an attorney who has had at least 20 hours of specialized training for child welfare and custody issues. In cases involving contested child custody, modifications of custody, modification of visitation, allegations of child neglect or child abuse, the Court can assign a Guardian Ad Litem to more closely evaluate the situation and report back to the court its findings. The Court or the Guardian Ad Litem can order psychological evaluations and drug testing if applicable to help in making a custody determination.

The cost of a Guardian Ad Litem can be rather high for most divorces in Georgia. Litigants should be aware that Fulton County offers a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) at a reduced hourly rate.

According to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, you can be awarded attorney’s fees in a divorce, but the award of attorney’s fees is ultimately decided by the judge assigned in your case. After the judge hears testimony from both you and your spouse, he or she will look at the facts of the case and base his or her decision on one factor – the financial circumstances of both parties in a divorce. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a)(1). This is similar to the award of alimony in a divorce case because the judge will look at both parties’ incomes and decide on one party’s ability or inability to pay attorney’s fees and the other party’s need for attorney’s fees. Even though you may ask for attorney’s fees, there is no guarantee that the judge will actually grant attorney’s fees in your case.

If the judge awards attorney’s fees in your divorce, the judge will sign a Final Order showing the amount of attorney’s fees that your spouse is required to pay. One of the disadvantages about the judge awarding attorney’s fees in your case is that amount of attorney’s fees that the judge awards in his Final Order may or may not reflect the total amount of attorney’s fees that you incurred in your divorce according to § 19-6-2(a)(2). The judge could actually award an amount less than what you incurred.

When the judge is determining the amount of attorney’s fees, he or she may look at several factors. The judge may review the invoices from both you and your spouse’s attorneys and determine if the amount that you incurred is fair. When reviewing the invoices, the judge may look at the hourly rates of staff at your law firm, such as the attorney, associate attorney, and/or paralegal working on your case, as well as the charges that you incurred as compared to those hourly rates and charges that your spouse incurred from the opposing law firm. As we mentioned previously in this blog, it is difficult to determine whether someone will be awarded attorney’s fees since the award is based on the sole discretion of the judge and because each divorce case and each judge is different, it is difficult to determine whether he or she will award attorney’s fees in your particular divorce case.

The exact statutory authorization for attorney’s fees under the Official Code of Georgia is:

Continue reading "Attorneys Fees in a Georgia Divorce under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 " »

When going through a divorce in Georgia with minor children involved, there are two categories of custody that you must consider: legal custody and physical custody. Legal custody has to do with a parent’s rights and responsibilities to make major decisions concerning the child, including the child’s health care, education, extracurricular activities and religious training. Physical custody has to do with where the child is physically living.

It is very common to see joint legal custody in divorce cases because it allows both parents to have equal rights and responsibilities for major decisions which, in turn, provides both parents the opportunity to remain involved in their child’s upbringing. With joint legal custody, one parent may have final decision making authority over major decisions in the event the parents are unable to agree. Alternatively, the parents can split final decision making authority with, for example, one parent having final decision making authority over education and extracurricular activities and the other parent having final decision making authority over health care and religious upbringing.

In Georgia, it is not as common to see joint physical custody as it is to see joint legal custody. Joint physical custody means that the child has substantially equal time and contact with each parent. In some situations, due to a parent’s work schedule or a child’s extracurricular commitments, joint physical custody is not practical. Parents should work together to come up with a custody and visitation schedule that works best for their particular situation while at the same time furthers the best interests of their children. Parents who do choose joint physical custody must work well together and have good communication as this arrangement will necessarily require them to see each other more often and cooperate continuously for the benefit of the children.

This blog entry regarding tax issues related to a divorce is intended to alert you to issues to think about and provide some basic information. Before you sign any tax return or take any action with respect to your federal or state income returns, please review your situation with your current tax advisor.

Change of Mailing Address
You may officially notify the I.R.S. that you have changed your mailing address from the address used on your last tax return by filing I.R.S. Form 8822.

Alimony
Spousal support or alimony is taxable to the recipient and deductible from the income of the payor if all I.R.S. requirements are met. Lump sum alimony is not deductable. For more information see Divorced or Separated Individuals - IRS's Form 504.

Child Support
Child support payments are not deductible from the income of the payor or taxable to the recipient. For more information see Divorced or Separated Individuals - IRS's Form 504.

Dependency Exemption for Minor Children
Unless specifically addressed in your Decree, generally the custodial parent will be entitled to claim the dependency exemption for the minor children on his or her income tax return. The custodial parent may execute I.R.S. Form 8332, releasing the dependency exemption to the non-custodial parent. Release of Claim to Exemption
for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents - I.R.S. Form 8332.

Continue reading "Divorce and Taxes" »

Under Georgia law, both parties in a divorce are required to attend a parenting seminar in Georgia if the parties have children under the age of 18 due to the volatile nature of divorce and the impact it has on children. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.8. The parties are not required to attend the seminar together - they can take it at separate locations and on different dates. Even though the content of the parenting seminar is basically the same throughout the state, each county manages its own parenting seminar program. Generally, the topics addressed are how to reduce stress for children during a divorce, visitation recommendations, financial obligations, conflict management, the changing parental roles during a divorce, stress indicators for children, and the needs and age appropriate expectations of children going through a divorce.

You can find more information for parenting seminars in Metropolitan Atlanta counties from our blog at:

• Cobb County
• DeKalb County
• Forsyth County
• Gwinnett County
• Fulton County

Continue reading "Atlanta Parenting Seminar Information" »

Forsyth County (Cumming) and Cherokee County (Ball Ground, Canton, and Woodstock) are part of the 9th judicial district. All of the counties in this 9th judicial district work jointly to offer their seminar for divorcing parents throughout the judicial district. They are currently offering seminars in:

• Cumming at the Forsyth County Library located at 585 Dahlonega Street, Cumming, GA 30040
• Canton at the R. T. Jones Memorial Library located at 116 Brown Industrial Parkway, Canton, GA 30114
• and in Blairsville, Clarkesville, Dahlonega, Ellijay, and Gainesville.

The cost of the seminar is currently $50.00 per person. You can find additional information about these seminars at 9th Judicial Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution website.

Many people assume that the mother automatically receives custody of the minor children in a divorce whether she is a fit or unfit parent and the father will never receive custody of the children. Contrary to what some people assume, the law is required to be gender neutral when evaluating custody.

In Georgia, the judge assigned to a divorce or modification action must make a determination of who should get custody based upon the broad concept of what is in the “minor child’s best interest.” When determining the best interest of the child, the judge will analyze a long list of factors in order to make his/her decision. The following are the list of factors for a judge to consider when awarding custody under Georgia family law:

(A) The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between each parent and the child;

(B) The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between the child and his or her siblings, half siblings, and stepsiblings and the residence of such other children;

(C) The capacity and disposition of each parent to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child;

Continue reading "Georgia Child Custody" »

Gwinnett County (Buford, Dacula, Duluth, Lawrenceville, Lilburn, Norcross, Snellville, and Suwanee) offers its Parenting Seminar in order to help parties involved in a divorce with minor children met their mandatory parenting time seminar at the Gwinnett Justice and Administration Center, 75 Langley Drive, Lawrenceville, Georgia 30045. Day seminars are held in conference room A West Wing. Evening seminars are held Jury assembly Room East Wing.

One unique fact about the Gwinnett seminars is they are offer either a four hour weekday seminar (from 9:00 am to 1:00 p.m.) or two two-hour evening sessions (from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.). The cost of the seminar is currently $30.00 per person and registration MUST be received prior to the day of the seminar. You can find additional information and register online for these seminars at the Gwinnett County Parenting Seminar website.

Fulton County (Alpharetta, Atlanta, Johns Creek, Milton, Roswell) offers its Family in Transition seminar in order to help parties involved in a divorce with minor children met their mandatory parenting time seminar at three different locations in the county. Currently, it is offering a:

• Saturday morning seminar once per month from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. at the Downtown Justice Center Building located at 160 Pryor Street, S.W., Courtroom G33, Atlanta, Georgia.
• Weekday morning seminar once per month from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. at the South Fulton Service Center located at 5600 Stonewall Tell Road, College Park, Georgia in the auditorium.
• Weekday evening seminar once per month from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. at the North Fulton Service Center located at 7741 Roswell Road, Atlanta, Georgia in the auditorium.

Please note that both the North and South service center locations require pre-registration. The cost of the seminar is currently $30.00 per person. You can find additional information about these seminars at Fulton County Families in Transition program website.

Cobb County (Acworth, Austell, Kennesaw, Marietta, Powder Springs and Smyrna) offers its Divorcing Parents Seminar in order to help parties involved in a divorce with minor children met their mandatory parenting time seminar at the Cobb County Superior Court Building (Building D; 6th floor jury assembly room), 30 Waddle Street, Marietta, GA 30090.

Cobb County (like Gwinnett) also offer both a four hour weekday seminar (from 8:30 am to 1:00 p.m.) or two two-hour evening sessions (from 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.). The cost of the seminar is currently $30.00 per person. You can find additional information and register online for these seminars at the Cobb County Divorcing Parents Seminar website.

DeKalb County (Avondale Estates, Chamblee, Decatur, Doraville, Lithonia, and Stone Mountain) offers its Seminar for Divorcing Parents at three different locations:

• The Callaway Building located at 120 West Trinity Place Room 311, Decatur, Georgia
• DeKalb County Courthouse Judicial Tower located at 556 N. McDonough St, 5th Floor Room “A”, Decatur, Georgia
• The Maloof Building located at 1300 Commerce Drive Decatur, Decatur, Georgia, in the Annex building

The seminars are held on:

• the first Wednesday of each month from 12:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.,
• the third Wednesday of each month from 9:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. and
• the fourth Friday of each month from 9:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.