Atlanta Divorce Attorney Blog

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently made a ruling that has the potential to affect every member of the military going through a divorce and dividing assets. In Michel v. Michel, the parties were married from September 1995 to February 2002, and then remarried from September 2002 until June 2009. Michel v. Michel, 286 Ga. 892, 893 (2010). In the 2009 divorce action, the wife sought a portion of the husband’s military retirement benefits as equitable division. Id. The Cherokee County trial court denied the wife’s request, finding that the current marriage at issue was only seven years and, pursuant to a code section of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, it could not award the wife an equitable portion of these benefits since the marriage was not ten years or more. Id.

The wife appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in ruling that it had no authority to award her a portion of these benefits, and the Supreme Court of Georgia agreed. Id. The Court held that “the Former Spouses’ Protection Act affirmatively grants state courts the power to treat military retirement benefits as marital property that is subject to equitable division upon a divorce.” Id., citing 10 USC §1408 (c)(1); Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 584 (1989).

In addressing the ten year marriage requirement, the Court held that the requirement “is simply a limitation on the direct payment” of funds from the Federal Government to the former spouse, and “it has no bearing on a state court’s authority to treat military retirement benefits as marital property subject to equitable division, even when a marriage lasted less than ten years.” Id. at 894.

In divorce and other family law cases, it is very important to follow the letter of the law in filing pleadings with the court so that you do not miss out on any hearings or other notices. In a recent case, the husband filed a Complaint for Divorce and the wife, who had no attorney at the time, acknowledged service of the Complaint, but did not file an Answer or any other responsive pleading. Ellis v. Ellis, 286 Ga. 625 (2010). Shortly thereafter, the wife retained an attorney who filed an entry of appearance, but did not file any responsive pleading on the wife’s behalf. Id. The final hearing, of which the husband’s attorney provided notice to the wife’s attorney, was rescheduled, and the husband’s attorney agreed to inform the wife’s attorney of the rescheduled date for the final hearing. Id. The husband subsequently retained a new attorney who moved the trial court to enter a final judgment of divorce on the pleadings, without holding a final hearing. Id. After the trial court granted the husband’s motion and entered a final judgment of divorce, the wife filed a notice for new trial, alleging an agreement by the husband’s former attorney to provide notice of a final hearing date. Id. at 626. The superior court refused to grant wife a new trial, holding that the wife waived notice by failing to file any responsive pleading and any alleged agreement did not change this fact. Id.

Unfortunately for the wife, the Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the superior court, as Georgia law is clear on this matter. OCGA §9-11-5(a) states: [T]he failure of a party to file pleadings in an action shall be deemed to be a waiver by him or her of all notices, including notices of time and place of trial and entry of judgment, and all service in the action, except service of pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief. . . .”

Thus, in any divorce case, it is prudent to use the motto “better safe than sorry” so that you do not end up like the wife in this case. Even if you think you have an agreement with your spouse or his/her attorney, it is best to file all pleadings necessary with the court and look out for yourself.

Paternity testing during a divorce case is not extremely common, but this issue does arise. The Georgia Court of Appeals recently affirmed a trial court’s denial of a mother’s motion to compel paternity testing of her husband. Williamson v. Williamson, 302 Ga. App. 115 (2010). In that divorce case, the wife alleged that the child born during the marriage might not be the biological child of the father and requested paternity testing. Id. at 116. After a temporary hearing in which the parties were awarded joint legal custody, the wife’s attorney sent a letter to the husband’s attorney confirming the parties’ agreement that paternity was no longer an issue. Id. Subsequently, the wife retained a new attorney and filed a motion requesting a paternity test, which the husband opposed. Id. The child’s guardian ad litem testified that a paternity test would not be in the child’s best interest and the court denied the wife’s motion. Id.

In her appeal, the wife alleges “she is not precluded from contesting paternity.” Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with her, stating neither the purported agreement nor the temporary order determined the issue on a final basis as there was not yet a final order in the case. Id. at 177.

However, even the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the wife had the right to contest paternity, it agreed with the trial court’s denial of her motion, which was based on the “best interest of the child” standard. Id. The wife had a huge hurdle to overcome since “[a]ll children born in wedlock are deemed under law to be legitimate.” Id. Further, “[t]he public policy favoring the presumption of a child’s legitimacy is one of the most firmly-established and persuasive precepts known in law.” Id., quoting Baker v. Baker, 376 Ga. 778, 779 (1) (582 SE2d 102) (2003). In affirming the denial of the wife’s motion to compel paternity testing, the Court of Appeals followed established Georgia law and held, “…even when the child's legal father may not be the biological father, a mother who wishes to delegitimate her child is not automatically entitled to compel the legal father to submit to genetic paternity testing but must first come forward with evidence sufficient to show that delegitimating the child is in the child's best interest. The record in this case contains no such threshold showing.” Williamson, 302 Ga. App. at 118.

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently affirmed a case from Gwinnett County Superior Court regarding relocation and child custody. Almon-Davis v. Davis, 286 Ga. 456 (2010). In that divorce case, both parties requested primary physical custody of their three minor sons. At the request of the husband, the court appointed a Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) to investigate and make a custody recommendation. Id. at 457. After conducting his investigation, the GAL recommended that the father, who was living in Denver at the time, have primary physical custody, and the trial court entered a final judgment and decree of divorce to this effect. Id.

The mother appealed, contending “the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the GAL's report and recommendation… without considering the impact on the children of the Husband's out-of-state move.” Id. The Georiga Supreme Court disagreed, quoting a seminal relocation case, which states: “When exercising its discretion in relocation cases, as in all child custody cases, the trial court must consider the best interests of the child and cannot apply a bright-line test…[T]he primary consideration of the trial court in deciding custody matters must be directed to the best interests of the child involved, that all other rights are secondary, and that any determination of the best interests of the child must be made on a case-by-case basis. This analysis forbids the presumption that a relocating custodial parent will always lose custody and, conversely, forbids any presumption in favor of relocation.” Id., quoting Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445 (2003). The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the transcript and found that the trial court’s consideration of the father’s move “in regard to the children’s welfare and its pragmatic consequences were pivotal” in its custody determinations. Almon-Davis at 458.

Thus, in relocation cases, there is not a presumption that someone will win or lose custody due to a party moving out of the city or state. The court will always look at the specific facts of the case and determine the best interests of the children involved.

When presenting your divorce, custody modification, child support modification, or other family law case to the trial court, it is imperative that your Atlanta divorce attorney presents all relevant evidence in your case. The Supreme Court of Georgia recently denied an appeal by a father in a divorce case who attempted to present evidence in his appellate brief that he did not present at his hearing in front of the Dekalb County trial court. Bankston v. Lachman, 286 Ga. 459 (2010). In that divorce case, the trial court awarded primary physical custody of the parties’ two-year-old daughter to the mother and awarded visitation to the father “for four hours each weekend until the child begins kindergarten full time,” at which point overnight visitation would begin. Id. at 459. Though the father requested overnight visitation to begin immediately, the trial court denied his request, explaining that “it believed young children should not spend long periods and weekends with non-custodial parents…[b]ased on everything [the court] had read and talked to about child development experts…” Id. at 460.

The father appealed the trial court’s denial of additional visitation arguing that “the trial court is out of sync with current opinion about the need to establish a firm parental bond between a child and his or her non-custodial parent,” and referencing two models recommending “that children have more visitation time, including overnight visits, with non-custodial parents, beginning at an early age, and increasing as the child grows older.” Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia pointed out, however, “the record does not reflect that that these models were presented to the trial court; nor does it show that trial counsel made the argument which husband asserts on appeal.” Id. Thus, these arguments could not be relied upon on appeal. The father had to prove that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the evidence presented to it, and this the father could not do.

The Court of Appeals recently addressed a custody modification in a military family. In Mitcham v. Spry, the parents’ divorce settlement agreement provided that the parties would have “joint legal and physical custody, with each parent having the minor child for six months and the custodial parent having final decision making authority.” Mitcham v. Spry, 300 Ga. App. 386 (2009). At the time of the divorce both parents were in the military, so they agreed that the child would reside with his paternal grandparents in Missouri during the parents’ periods of active duty. Id. at 387.

After both parents separated from the military, the father filed a Petition for Modification of Custody and the trial court found that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a change of primary physical custody to the father. Id. at 388. The mother appealed, arguing that the grounds upon which the trial court relied were equally weighted and, thus, custody should remain the same.

Upon review of the transcript and record, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The Court of Appeals reiterated that the trial court must look at the best interests of the child in determining custody, which they did in this case. The transcript did show that “the trial court acknowledged that both parties were fit and nurturing parents; that both had established a loving relationship with the child; and that since the time of the divorce, the parties had shared equal custody of the child.” Id. at 390. However, the trial court found that the father had a strong support system by living near his family, and that the child had developed a strong bond with the paternal grandparents from spending so much time there while his parents were deployed. Id. Under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals agreed that these facts tipped the scales in favor of the father and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father primary custody.

Recently, the Georgia Court of Appeals heard a case where a divorce settlement agreement affected property in the estate of one of the parties after his death. In Frier v. Frier, the parties entered into a settlement agreement regarding distribution of their property, which notably stated that each party “shall have and receive any sums of money [in] their respective checking accounts, savings accounts, IRAs, retirement funds or accounts or other properties in their own individual names." Frier v. Frier, A09A1876; Frier v. Frier, A09A1877 (2010). The husband had previously established a 12 month certificate of deposit, which was payable to the wife upon his death. Id. at 2. After the execution of the settlement agreement but before the final divorce, the husband renewed the CD but did not change the wife as beneficiary. Id. The husband died shortly after the divorce was finalized and the wife alleged that, as beneficiary, she was entitled to the funds in the CD. Id.

Despite a challenge by the executor of the husband’s estate, who argued that the settlement agreement terminated the wife’s rights as a payable on death payee, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in favor of the wife. The Court stated that though the wife “relinquished the interest she may have had in the account by virtue of her marriage,” the settlement agreement language was not sufficiently broad so as to waive “her right to payment from the POD account as the death beneficiary specified by [the husband] when he created the account and so remaining on the day he died.” Id. at 4.

In this case, the facts are not clear whether the husband intended to remove his ex-wife as beneficiary. Either way, it is a lesson to those going through a divorce of how important it is to make sure your settlement agreement addresses all assets clearly and to check and/or change the beneficiaries of any accounts you may have to prevent unintended consequences.

Recently, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the enforcement of a divorce settlement agreement over the wife/mother's objection. In that case, the father filed for divorce and sought legal and physical custody of the parties’ children. Martinez v. Martinez, 301 Ga. App. 330 (2009). While the divorce proceedings remained pending, the father filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. He contended that the parties had reached the agreement wherein he would be the primary custodial parent and the mother would have visitation rights. Id. The trial court granted the father’s motion and entered a “Final Order on Custody and Visitation” in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement. Id.

The mother appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in enforcing the settlement agreement “because she did not assent to the terms of the settlement and lacked capacity to contract at the time in question due to her medical condition,” and argued that the trial court “refused to receive any evidence from the parties” at the hearing on the father’s motion. Id. at 332. The mother’s allegations regarding evidence at the hearing, however, were disputed by the father and inconsistent with the trial court’s order on the motion. The Georgia Court of Appeals, therefore, affirmed, citing well established case law stating that “'[i]n order for the appellate court to determine whether the judgment appealed from was erroneous, it is the duty of the appellant to include in the record those items which will enable the appellate court to perform an objective review of the evidence and proceedings.'" Atwood v. Southeast Bedding Co., 236 Ga. App. 116 (1) (511 S.E.2d 232) (1999). Id. at 332-333. Further, "'where the proof necessary for determination of the issues on appeal is omitted from the record, an appellate court must assume that the judgment below was correct and affirm.'" Enchanted Valley RV Park Resort v. Weese, 241 Ga. App. 415, 417 (1) (c) (526 SE2d 124) (1999). Id. Because there was no transcript or other evidence in the record on appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals was bound to presume that the trial court was correct.

Recently, the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the issue of a parent not being properly served with a custody modification action. In that case, pursuant to their Dekalb county divorce decree, the parties were granted joint legal and physical custody of their son. Hudson v. Easterling, 301 Ga. App. 207 (2009). Shortly after the divorce was final, the mother filed a petition for contempt against the father alleging several violations of the divorce decree. Id. While the contempt petition was still pending, the mother filed a petition to modify visitation but the father was not served with this action due to an incorrect address. Id. The Dekalb county trial court held a hearing on both the contempt and modification actions, for which the notice was sent to the father’s correct address. Both parties appeared at the hearing where the court granted the mother’s modification petition. Id.

The father appealed, contending that “trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was not personally served with the modification petition,” but the Georgia Court of Appeals rejected his argument. Id. at 208. The Court affirmed long standing Georgia law holding that the father “personally appeared at the hearing on the modification petition,” and “[n]othing in the record shows that [he] raised the issue of insufficient service of process at that time.” Id. The father, therefore, implicitly consented to jurisdiction and waived any claim of insufficient service of process. Id.

The Georgia Supreme Court recently heard a case wherein parties were divorced and the wife was awarded half of the husband’s 401K, which was to be paid to her via a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”). Killingsworth v. Killingsworth, 286 GA. 234 (2009). After the husband failed to comply with provisions of the parties' divorce decree, the wife filed a motion for contempt against him. The trial court found the husband in contempt, ordering him to pay the wife a cash sum which included the 401K funds. Id. at 235. The husband appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in requiring him to pay the 401K funds in cash, as that was an impermissible modification of the divorce decree.

The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the husband, stating that “[a] trial court may interpret a divorce decree, or clarify a prior order or judgment, in the course of resolving contempt issues placed before it,” but that “a trial court has no power to modify the terms of a divorce decree in a contempt proceeding.” Id. at 236. The Georgia Supreme Court stated that, since the divorce decree specifically stated that the 401K funds were to be transferred to the wife via QDRO, “transmuting this award into a presently due cash obligation of $ 1,850 was ‘so contrary to the apparent intention of the original order as to amount to a modification.’” Id. The Court reversed the portion of the contempt order requiring the husband to pay the 401K funds to the wife in cash, but adamantly stated that the husband was not relieved of his obligation to transfer the funds to the wife via QDRO. Id.

Recently, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the great discretion of the Dekalb County trial court in determining how to handle a father who was in contempt of his child support obligation. Henry v. Beacham, 301 Ga. App. 160 (2009). The father, who was a professional football player, had failed to make child support payments according to the trial court’s temporary order in the case. Id. at 161. In addition, the trial court found that, despite his significant income, he “had encountered financial problems over the course of his professional athletic career.” Id. In light of these facts, the trial court ordered an income deduction order and ordered that the father “fund a $ 250,000 trust, which would be invaded only in the event that [he] failed to pay his obligations.” Id. Any money remaining in the trust would be refunded to the father at the conclusion of his child support obligation.

The father was later found in contempt for failing to fund the trust and appealed, alleging that the trust was not authorized under the child support guidelines. Id. at 162. The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed, quoting OCGA 19-6-15(c)(2)(B) which states that the trial court is authorized to order the "manner, how often, to whom, and until when the support shall be paid." Id. at 163. The Court further stated that OCGA 19-6-15, “as a whole establishes that the legislature has granted trial courts broad discretion when ruling on child support obligations based on the factors presented to the court at the time of the award.” Id. at 163. Looking at the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the father to fund a trust in case he, again, failed to satisfy his child support obligation.

A decision of a Fulton County judge regarding jurisdiction in a custody modification case was recently overturned in Murillo v. Murillo, 360 Ga. App. 61 (2009). A husband and wife were divorced in Fulton County in 1997 and the wife was granted custody of the parties’ child. Id. at 62. In 2002, the wife moved with the child to North Carolina. In 2008, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), the husband filed a Petition to Modify Custody in Fulton County Superior Court. Id. The trial court then granted the wife’s motion asking the court to decline jurisdiction as North Carolina was the more convenient forum for the proceeding. Id.

Generally, since Fulton County was the court that entered the original custody ruling, Fulton County had “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” over the modification action unless the court determines that it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. OCGA §19-9-67. To make that determination, OCGA §19-9-67(b) requires the court to consider all of the following factors:

(1) Whether family violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
(2) The length of time the child has resided outside this state;
(3) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
(4) The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
(6) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;
(7) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.

In vacating the decision of the Fulton County court, the Court of Appeals did not say that the end result was incorrect per se, but rather emphasized that the court did not consider and reference ALL of the required factors in its written Order in making its decision that it was no longer a convenient forum. Id. at 64. Thus, the Court of Appeals directed the trial courts to always consider ALL of the factors in making a jurisdiction decision.

The Court of Appeals recently emphasized the due process required before incarcerating a person for contempt of a divorce decree. In Bauman v. Humphries, according to the parties’ divorce decree, the wife was required to enroll the minor children in private school and pay all associated expenses. Bauman v. Humphries, 300 Ga. App. 263 (2009). Following a hearing, the trial court found the wife in willful contempt of this provision of the divorce decree, but gave her the opportunity to purge herself of the contempt by enrolling the children at the specified school by a specified date. Id. If the wife failed to purge herself, she was to be incarcerated until she complied. Id. at 264. Shortly thereafter, the husband’s attorney sent a letter to the court alleging that the wife failed to comply by the specified date and included a proposed order for incarceration, which the trial court signed. Id.

Upon appeal by the wife, the Court of Appeals reversed, relying on well-settled Supreme Court of Georgia rulings and stating that "in Georgia, a trial court cannot order incarceration pursuant to a self-effectuating order, regarding future acts, without benefit of a hearing." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Smith, 280 Ga. 620, 621 (632 SE2d 83) (2006). The Court went on to state that even when a hearing has been held adjudging a person in contempt, the trial court cannot sign an order of incarceration based upon a letter from an interested individual. Bauman at 264. The Court of Appeals quoted the Supreme Court of Georgia, which held that “the court may only act, at a minimum, on an ‘affidavit . . . from a neutral and disinterested court official or other officer based upon objective information.’” Hall v. Doyle-Hall, 284 Ga. 325, 326 (667 SE2d 81) (2008).

The Georgia Supreme Court recently affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal of an alimony award as contrary to the evidence presented at trial. Coker v. Coker, 286 Ga. 20 (2009). The parties were married for approximately 24 years and had no children together. The only marital asset was a house. In addition, the husband had a separate asset, an interest in an LLC, which was worth approximately $100,000, but could not be converted to cash. Id. at 20, 21. The wife’s income was $45,000 and the husband’s income at the time of trial was $500/week, though the trial court determined his annual income to be $30,000. Id. Despite the husband’s meager income and assets, the trial court awarded the wife lump sum alimony in the amount of $36,500, which was to be paid within 3 months of the final decree of divorce. Id.

Generally, alimony is to be awarded based upon the needs of the party to whom it is awarded and the ability of the other party to pay. OCGA § 19-6-1 (c). In determining whether alimony should be awarded, and the amount thereof, the court looks at many factors, including the separate assets of each party and their earning capacities. OCGA § 19-6-1 (a). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the wife’s anticipated expenses justified her need for alimony, but stated that “the record is completely devoid of any evidence of Husband's ability to pay the trial court's lump sum alimony award.” Id. at 22. Without that evidence, the award must be reversed.

Recently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a Gwinnett Superior Court’s granting of a wife’s motion to strike the husband’s demand for a jury trial in the parties’ divorce action. In a divorce case, either party can demand a jury trial. Generally, “when a party makes a timely demand for a jury trial, the trial court cannot proceed without a jury unless the parties consent to a bench trial by a written stipulation filed with the court or an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record.” OCGA § 9-11-39 (a). One exception to this general rule is that “a party in a divorce case can, by [his] voluntary actions, impliedly waive a demand for a jury trial.” Matthews v. Matthews, 268 Ga. 863, 864 (2) (494 SE2d 325) (1998).

In Kauttner v. Kauttner, the wife filed for divorce and the husband requested a jury trial. Kautter v. Kautter, 286 Ga. 16 (2009). When the case was called for trial, the husband deliberately chose not to attend and instructed his attorney not to participate in the proceedings. As a result, the wife filed a motion to strike the jury demand. The Gwinnett Superior Court granted the wife’s motion and conducted a bench trial, and the husband appealed.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the granting of the motion to strike the husband’s demand for jury trial. The Court emphasized that the husband knew of the trial date and had no legitimate reason for not attending. Though the husband argued that by not attending he did not intend to waive the demand for jury trial, the Court stated that his actions were an implicit waiver and the trial court was authorized to strike his demand.

One of the most confusing aspects of child custody cases can be where the case should be filed when the parents live in different states. Generally, in regards to custody modification actions, the law limits a parent’s ability to terminate the continuing jurisdiction of the court that made the original custody determination in order to prevent the noncustodial parent from trying to use his or her “home jurisdiction advantage” to modify custody to the disadvantage of the custodial parent. There is, however, one exception to this general rule which provides that a Georgia court "has temporary emergency jurisdiction [to make a child custody determination] if the child is present in this state and . . . it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." O.C.G.A. §19-9-64(a).

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue in Taylor v. Curl (A09A0749). In that case, subsequent to the parties’ Jackson County divorce, the mother moved with the children to Florida and the father moved to Walker County. While the children were visiting the father, he filed a petition for temporary and emergency custody of his children in the Superior Court of Walker County, citing mistreatment and abuse of the children by their mother. The mother appealed arguing that Walker County was not the proper venue for the custody modification. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling granting temporary custody to the father, thereby affirming jurisdiction. Since the father met the two requirements outlined in O.C.G.A. §19-9-64(a), the trial court properly exercised temporary, emergency jurisdiction.

On April 28, 2009, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed an Order of the Dekalb County Superior Court finding a wife in contempt of the equitable distribution portion of the parties’ divorce decree. Farris v. Farris (S09A0302). Following a November 13, 2007 bench trial, Judge Castellani made an oral ruling regarding equitable distribution of the parties’ assets, but did not formalize this ruling until over a month later. The divorce decree provided that the wife shall place the marital residence on the market and shall control all aspects of the listing and sale for six months. If the residence did not sell within six months, the husband would take over control of the listing and sale, and this process shall repeat every six months until the house sold. The parties were to equally split the proceeds from the sale and the house was not to be sold for less than $650,000.00.

After the oral ruling but before entry of the final decree of divorce, the husband offered to purchase the wife’s interest in the house for $325,000, but the wife rejected this offer. Shortly after the final decree was entered, the wife accepted an offer on the house from the parties’ daughter in the amount of $650,150, which the husband rejected. The wife then filed a motion to hold the husband in contempt for rejecting this offer and the husband filed a motion for contempt against the wife for rejecting his offer. The Judge found the wife in contempt.

The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, stating adamantly that the wife could not be held in contempt of the divorce decree because there was no divorce decree entered at the time of husband’s offer. “Before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order should inform him in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him, and the command must therefore be express rather than implied. [Cit.]" (Punctuation omitted.) Hall v. Nelson, 282 Ga. 441, 444 (3) (651 SE2d 72) (2007).” Simply put, an oral Order is not sufficient for contempt. A person is not bound by a divorce decree until it is in writing and entered by the court.

On June 1, 2009, the Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed the great discretion of the trial courts in determining the amount and length of alimony. In Sprouse v. Sprouse (S09F0709), the parties entered into a common law marriage in Alabama in 1996, which was terminated by divorce in 2001. Subsequently, the parties resumed living together and married on March 5, 2005. Approximately two years later, the husband filed for divorce and, after a bench trial, the wife was awarded alimony for 13 years. The husband appealed, contending that the alimony award was excessive in amount and duration in light of the parties’ relatively short marriage. Specifically, the husband argued that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the entire length of time the parties had been together, rather than just the length of the marriage.

Unlike child support, there is no statutory formula for determining alimony. Rather, there are eight statutory factors that the Judge can consider in awarding the amount and length of alimony, if any. O.C.G.A. §19-6-5(a). http://www.atlantadivorceattorneyblog.com/2008/10/what_are_the_factors_in_determ.html#more Here, the Supreme Court found that the trial court had discretion to consider length of the parties’ entire relationship as a factor in determining alimony under O.C.G.A. §19-6-5(a)(8), a catch-all provision allowing the court to consider “such other relevant factors as the court deems equitable and proper.” Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[i]n the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of alimony . . . and to this end they are to use their experience as enlightened persons in judging the amount necessary for support under the evidence as disclosed by the record and all the facts and circumstances of the case.” Arkwright v. Arkwright, 284 Ga. 545, 546 (2) (a) (668 SE2d 709) (2008).

On March 23, 2009, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s denial of the wife’s motion for new trial in her divorce action in Rembert v. Rembert (S08F1582). Specifically, the wife alleged that the trial court erred in granting final decision making authority to the husband, who was the primary physical custodian of the parties’ children, and in awarding primary physical custody to the husband.

In regard to decision making, the wife argued that the parties did not truly have joint legal custody because the husband had final decision making authority. The Supreme Court disagreed, reaffirming a prior holding that the language of the statute governing legal custody “clearly vests in the trial court discretion to decide which parent should be empowered to make final decisions where the parents are unable to agree.” Citing Frazier v. Frazier, 280 Ga. 687, 690 (2006). As the primary physical custodian, it was appropriate that the father had final decision making authority in the likely event that the parties would not agree.

In regard to primary physical custody, the Supreme Court held that it would not disturb the trial court’s judgment awarding custody to the father, who had a stable home and a job with a regular schedule, instead of the mother, who was dating a married man, was a full time student with substantial debt, and had threatened the life of a neighbor.

On March 5, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of a grandmother’s adoption petition in Owen v. Watts (A08A2012), something the appellate courts rarely do. The child had been removed from her home with her mother and grandmother and placed with a foster family. The grandmother then filed a petition to adopt the child and the foster parents, who had previously filed a petition to adopt the child, intervened in that action. The trial court granted the grandmother’s petition to adopt the child and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that “there was no record evidence that supported a finding that the adoption was in the best interest of the child.” The grandmother’s testimony that she loved the child, had taken her to doctor’s appointments and had an appropriate house for the child to live in was held to be insufficient to meet this standard.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that reversing the grant of adoption is something that the appellate courts rarely do, but rested its decision on the “plethora of evidence…from which the trial court could have concluded that an adoption by Watts was not in [the child’s] best interest.”

On March 13, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s termination of a father’s parental rights in In the Interest of D.F. (A08A2371). The father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of his parental misconduct or inability, or that termination of parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the father, holding that “[t]he evidence authorized the juvenile court to find that although the father has not engaged in any abuse or intentional misconduct whatsoever toward his children, and although he has made a sincere and food faith effort to obtain reunification with the children by meeting his parental responsibilities, his mental infirmities simply render him incapable of parenting the children without the full-time assistance that is unavailable to him.” The Court, thus, found that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

On February 10, 2009, in Hall v. Wellborn (A08A1800), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a mother’s Petition to Enforce Custody due to lack of jurisdiction. In December 2003, the mother divorced her former husband and was awarded custody of the minor child who, through paternity testing, was found not to be the child of the former husband. Shortly thereafter, the mother and child moved to Florida where the child’s biological father lived. The father filed a paternity action in Florida seeking sole custody and was awarded primary physical custody of the child.

Shortly thereafter, the mother filed an action in Georgia seeking to enforce the original Georgia custody Order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of this action because the Georgia court had lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Under the UCCJEA, a Georgia court that makes an initial child custody determination maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over subsequent custody matters except when neither the child nor the child’s parents have a significant connection to the state, or when neither the child nor the child’s parents presently reside in the state. Thus, Georgia lost jurisdiction and Florida was the proper state in which to bring this custody action.

On February 23, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Dekalb county juvenile court’s deprivation ruling in In the Interest of Z.D. (A09A0487). The Dekalb juvenile court based its deprivation finding on the following evidence: (1) one child was punished for bedwetting by “either sitting on the toilet for prolonged periods of time or being made to sit in cold bath water;” (2) the father did not seek medical treatment for the children’s extremely unusual eating behaviors and, instead, beat the children with a belt if they ate school cafeteria food; (3) the father refused to agree to a home visit; (4) the father tried to withdraw the children from school after reports of suspected abuse; and (5) the father did not follow the DFCS safety plan. Based on the above, the Court of Appeals found that the deprivation finding by the juvenile court was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

On February 23, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Dekalb county juvenile court’s deprivation ruling in In the Interest of N.H. (A08A1759). During the course of DFCS’ investigation of a teenage mother and her child which raised significant concerns, the DFCS case worker secured the services of a parenting support company to instruct the mother on what to feed infants and, generally, how to care for infants. During the parenting specialist’s visit to the home, she noted that the mother fed the infant inappropriate food despite instruction that it was inappropriate. As a result of the investigation, the juvenile court found that the mother “had intellectual limitations evidenced by her continued improper feeding of the child.” Despite the mother’s objection to the deprivation finding because the parenting specialist assigned by DFCS only visited the home once, the Court of Appeals found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of deprivation.

On January 30, 2009, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s award of custody to the child’s maternal grandmother instead of her father. In Galtieri v. O’Dell (A08A1822), the biological father, who had legitimated the child, contended that the trial court erred in its determination because it failed to find that awarding custody to him would harm the child.

The Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the trial court’s ruling, stating that “it is clear that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal analysis for determining whether custody should be awarded to…the maternal grandmother, rather than…the biological father.” Specifically, the Court pointed to O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1), which establishes a rebuttable presumption in custody disputes between a biological parent and a third party relative that it is in the child’s best interest to award custody to the parent. To win custody, the third party relative must show by clear and convincing evidence that awarding custody to the parent would harm the child. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s statement that “from the personal experience of the court…it would be detrimental to the child to move from Georgia” was insufficient to meet this standard.

On January 28, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Gwinnett County Juvenile Court regarding the modification of a temporary child support award in a deprivation case. In In the Interest of R.F. (A08A1683), a biological mother’s five children were found to be deprived and removed from her custody, and she was ordered to pay child support to the temporary custodians. She alleged that the trial court erred by treating her motion as one for modification of child support rather than a final child support order, ignoring statutory guidelines in determining the child support amount, and in refusing to modify the previous order.

The Court of Appeals rejected the mother’s argument that her petition was one for a final child support order. The Court questioned whether a juvenile court was the proper jurisdiction for a final child support order, but rested its holding on the fact that there had been no final disposition of the deprivation proceedings and, thus, there could be no final order.

The mother further contended that the trial court erred in treating funds from trust proceeds as her income for purposes of a child support determination. The Court of Appeals easily dismissed this argument, citing to O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(f)(1)(A)(x), which states that both trust income and gifts that consist of cash should be included in calculating gross income for child support purposes.

In addition, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in refusing to modify the child support amount. Interestingly, though the mother was trying to modify her support obligation downward, she argued that the substantial change warranting modification was the fact that the children had increased educational expenses. The Court simply stated that “the fact that the needs of the children have increased cannot serve as the basis for decreasing the amount of child support a parent is obligated to pay” and found no other basis for downward modification, based upon the evidence presented at trial.

In In the Interest of R.J.M. (A08A1919), a mother appealed the Order of the Fulton county juvenile court sustaining a petition for deprivation to which she stipulated and which keeps the child in the custody of Fulton county DFCS. After the minor child was sexually abused by her father, DFCS filed a Petition for Deprivation and the child was removed from the home. Subsequently, an Amended Petition for Deprivation was filed, wherein the mother stipulated that the child was deprived, and the parties submitted a proposed Protective Order to the Judge that would allow the child to remain living with her mother. The court reviewed the evidence and the proposed Protective Order, but decided not to return custody to the mother.

The mother appealed, contending that she stipulated to the deprivation only because the agreement was for the child to be returned to her. On February 10, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the juvenile court, holding that “[h]ad the juvenile court merely followed the parties’ recommended disposition despite reservations it had about immediately returning R.J.M. to the mother, the juvenile court would have acted contrary to its fundamental obligation in deprivation proceedings to protect the welfare of the child.”

On February 9, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Gwinnett county juvenile court’s finding that a child was deprived under O.C.G.A. §15-11-2(8)(A), reaffirming the standard that a juvenile court’s ruling will stand if it was supported by clear and convincing evidence. In In the Interest of J.S. (A08A1993), a mother appealed the deprivation ruling, arguing that there was insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals rejected the mother’s claim, since the evidence suggested that the mother had filed numerous unsubstantiated claims of sexual abuse against the father and a young boy at a homeless shelter where the mother and child were living. The Court held that evidence of “repeated unfounded investigations of sexual abuse” has been held to be sufficient evidence of deprivation, and that the evidence in this case authorized the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the child was deprived.

On February 9, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the Gwinnett county juvenile court’s finding that a child was deprived under O.C.G.A. §15-11-2(8)(A), reaffirming the standard that a juvenile court’s ruling will stand if it was supported by clear and convincing evidence. In In the Interest of J.S. (A08A1993), a mother appealed the deprivation ruling, arguing that there was insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals rejected the mother’s claim, since the evidence suggested that the mother had filed numerous unsubstantiated claims of sexual abuse against the father and a young boy at a homeless shelter where the mother and child were living. The Court held that evidence of “repeated unfounded investigations of sexual abuse” has been held to be sufficient evidence of deprivation, and that the evidence in this case authorized the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the child was deprived.

On November 17, 2008, the Supreme Court of Georgia reaffirmed long standing case law that it will not set aside a trial court’s factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. In Vereen v. Vereen (S08F0736), the Husband in a Gwinnett County divorce action contended that the trial court failed to consider evidence in making its rulings on child support, alimony, attorney’s fees and a tax debt, and failed to enforce a temporary order in the case.

Specifically, the Husband alleged that the trial court erred in its determination of his income, determination that his age and health conditions did not affect his ability to pay child support, and allocation of responsibility for a $27,000 tax debt to him. The Supreme Court found that the trial court specifically considered extensive evidence on these issues including testimony from the Husband regarding his income and health, evidence regarding his payment of the mortgage and other bills, evidence of his major cash purchases, and evidence that the tax debt was his alone. Satisfied that the trial court did not err, the Supreme Court declined Husband’s request that the trial court’s Order be overturned.

The Husband further alleged that the trial court erred in failing to enforce a temporary order in the case. To this allegation of error, the Supreme Court simply states that “the record reflects no motion by Husband to hold Wife in contempt for having allegedly failed to comply with this order” and “[w]ithout a ruling from the trial court on this issue, there can be no finding of error.”

On January 26, 2009, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued a ruling in Amerson v. Vandiver (S08A1707) regarding a Father’s agreement to termination of his parental rights in a divorce action. In March 2004, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in their divorce action wherein the Mother would have sole, permanent custody of the children and the Father agreed to the termination of his parental rights. Four years later, the Father moved to set aside the Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce alleging that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights.

After the superior court agreed with the Father and set aside the part of the judgment terminating his parental rights, the Mother appealed. The Supreme Court of Georgia pointed out that the juvenile courts, not the superior court, have sole jurisdiction for terminating parental rights, except in the case of adoption proceedings. Nonetheless, the Court went on to say that “[t]he stability of the family and of society demands that one who intends to attack an apparently valid decree of divorce should proceed with the utmost promptness.” The Court reversed the superior court’s ruling and held that the Father’s acts of invoking superior court jurisdiction for his divorce and entering into a settlement agreement which the superior court incorporated into its final decree, coupled with the Father’s four year delay in trying to set the decree aside, prevented him from attacking the agreement.

On November 13, 2008, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a ruling in Kean v. Marshall (A08A0828) regarding the issue of proper jurisdiction for a child support modification action. The original child support Order was in Alabama, but the Mother sought to record and modify the Order in Georgia pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The Mother filed her Petition in Henry County, Georgia, contending that the Father resided there and was, therefore, subject to jurisdiction. The trial court denied the Father’s motion to dismiss the action due to lack of jurisdiction and entered an Order modifying the child support amount.

The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling finding that the evidence reflected that the Father was domiciled in Alabama. The Court of Appeals placed emphasis on the fact that the Father “was registered to vote in Alabama, has always paid Alabama income taxes, has an Alabama driver’s license, and cares for his elderly father in Alabama.” There was also extensive evidence that the Father considered Alabama to be his home and intended to remain there, despite his military placement. Though the Mother argued that he resided in Georgia because he spent time there in the military and entered into an apartment lease while he was there, the Court of Appeals specifically found that the term “reside” does not mean “domiciled,” and that a person’s domicile is the place where the person resides with an intent to remain permanently or for an indefinite period of time. In reversing the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he proper focus is whether the record contained evidence that [the Father] took any action to change his residence from Alabama to Georgia, and the record is devoid of evidence showing any such action.”

Interestingly, in this case, the Order modifying child support was based upon an agreement by the parties with the Father reserving his right to appeal based on lack of jurisdiction.

In the Georgia Court of Appeals finding of deprivation in In the Interest of B.H. (A08A1102) on November 17, 2008, the Court addressed several procedural issues in juvenile court proceedings. First, The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s excluding of testimony by the child’s former court-appointed special advocate (CASA). The parents wanted the CASA to testify to dispute the child’s previous allegations. Georgia law defines the CASA role as to advocate for the best interests of the child and protects the CASA/child relationship by keeping information acquired by the CASA confidential. Though confidential information could be disclosed with a court order, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that requiring this CASA to testify would be “inconsistent with the purpose of the CASA program” especially because the parents had multiple other witnesses to impeach the child.

Next, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling limiting the scope of discovery requested by the parents, since the parents had already obtained the requested information in other formats.

In addition, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s requirement that the Father view the child’s testimony from a television monitor in another room. Though there is a constitutional right to confront one’s witnesses, the Court of Appeals addressed the importance of protecting a child witness from trauma and held that, since the Father could view the testimony as it occurred and the court provided a person to run notes from the Father to his attorney, the Father’s constitutional rights were not violated.

Continue reading "Deprivation (Procedural Issues) - Georgia Case Law Update" »

On December 1, 2008, in In the Interest of A.R., the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the deprivation ruling of the juvenile court over the Father’s challenge of the sufficiency of evidence and admission of evidence. The Father contended that the juvenile court erred in finding the children deprived, since there was no evidence that he was the person who hurt the children. The Court of Appeals disagreed, referring to evidence that the children were injured and became developmentally delayed while in the Father’s care, and the fact that the Father’s incarceration rendered him unable to comply with the reunification plan.

The Father further challenged the admissibility of certain testimony and documentary evidence, but failed to provide support for his appeal of these issues or to show how the admissibility was reversible. In its holdings, the Court of Appeals implicitly stressed the importance of being specific in how and why the lower court erred, which is a guideline all parties should follow in appeals.

In Rumley-Miawama v. Miawama (S08F1541), the Supreme Court of Georgia heard a Wife’s appeal from the judgment in her divorce case. The Wife was unhappy with the visitation, child support and equitable division of property portions of the trial court’s judgment.

In regard to child support, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision not to apply a deviation from the child support guidelines for equal parenting time and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing not to apply this deviation. The Supreme Court pointed out that the trial court did use its discretion to give the Wife a deviation for travel expenses.

The Supreme Court of Georgia did agree with the Wife that the trial court erred in including a self-executing change of visitation provision in its judgments. The visitation portion of the judgment, which takes effect if Wife moves out of state and significantly limits her visitation, was reversed, as the Supreme Court held that it failed to reflect consideration of the best interests of the children, which is of paramount importance in Georgia.

Continue reading "Georgia Case Law Update – Visitation, Child Support, Marital Property " »

The Georgia Court of Appeals has entered a decision on November 13, 2008 in regards to the effective date of a modification of child support award. In Hampton v Nesbit(A08A1887) the court of appeals held that the Judge Merck, DeKalb Superior Court, abused its discretion in ordering a delay in the upward modification of child support until such time as the past due child support payments have been made.

In that action, the father had filed a petition seeking joint physical and legal custody of the minor child. The mother counterclaimed for contempt due to father’s past due child support payments. After hearing evidence, the trial court entered an income deduction order against the father which ordered the father to repay the arrearages at a rate of $300 per month beginning October 1, 2007 in order to avoid jail time and increased the amount of child support from $525 per month to $800 per month starting October 1, 2008 (at which point the trial court determined that the father should be caught up with his arrearages). The mother appealed indicating that the trial court could not delay the effective date of the upward award of modification.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the trial court did not have the right to fully delay implementation of the upward modification. Specifically, the Court of Appeals focused its attention upon O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(3)(B) which provides:

If there is a difference of 30 percent or more between a new award and a Georgia child support order entered prior to January 1, 2007, the court may, at its discretion, phase in the new child support award over a period of up to two years with the phasing in being largely evenly distributed with at least an initial immediate adjustment of not less than 25 percent of the difference and at least one intermediate adjustment prior to the final adjustment at the end of the phase-in period.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals specifically held that while the trial court did not have authority to completely delay the modification it could have phased in the modification had the statutory requirements been met. Of note, the Court of Appeals also held that past due child support cannot be considered when reducing or increasing income under the child support calculations.

On November 3, 2008, the Supreme Court of Georgia reached decision by a 4 to 3 vote, that held a party could seek a declaratory judgment as to his obligation for PAST due child support. Acevedo v. Kim f/k/a Acevedo, S08A0798 (11/3/08). While this decision is perhaps more important for lawyers handling cases to understand, it does emphasize some interesting legal principals.

Prior to discussing the case further, it is important to understand what a declaratory judgment is. A declaratory judgment is, among other things, a procedural mechanism litigants use to determine their “rights and obligations under a divorce decree that is unclear”. Acevedo. It is used to remove a party from the “risk of taking some future action that, without direction, would jeopardize his interest”. Acevedo.

The unique question before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether it was appropriate for to ask for a declaratory judgment for PAST due child support obligations. The majority opinion held that since there was a very real risk that he would be brought up on charges of contempt of court, “he needed direction from a judicial tribunal to remove the uncertainty regarding the consequences of his planned future actions.” A very strong dissent argued, however, that since the support at issue only involved previously owed arrearages, then “the logical consequence of this contrived construction would be the seeking of declaratory judgment as a defense to the payment of any found obligation or debt, thus spawning unnecessary and spurious litigation”. Acevedo.

While it remains to be seen what develops from this recent case, the close decision and unique construction of what is grounds for a declaratory judgment suggests that this will not be the last time we visit this issue in Georgia.

On July 16, 2008, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a ruling In the Interest of J. L. C., A08A0679, that upheld a termination of parental rights. In that matter, DFCS petitioned for the termination of parental rights based upon allegations that the parents had not: 1) obtained adequate housing for the child; 2) maintained employment; 3) contributed to support for the child; 4) visited the child, and had a history of chronic, un-rehabilitated use of drugs or alcohol. The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court noting that the criteria for terminating parental rights are well established:

"First, there must be a finding of parental misconduct or inability, which requires clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the child is deprived; (2) the lack of proper parental care or control is the cause of the deprivation; 3) the cause of the deprivation is likely to continue; and (4) continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child. If these four factors exist, then the court must determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, considering the child’s physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs, including the need for a secure, stable home."

The Georgia Supreme Court issued an order today in Pineres v. George, S08A0773, which has several implications for Georgia law. First, it held that a trial judge has no authority in a contempt proceeding to modify the obligations imposed by a divorce decree. Second, the Georgia Supreme Court held that medical expenses constitute a form a child support.

Of note in this case, the modification being sought was in regards to the psychological expenses for the minor child and there had previously been a petition for modification of child support made less than two years ago. Because Georgia law prohibits a modification of child support less than two years after an order on a previous modification petition by the same spouse, it upheld an awarded of frivolous litigation fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 against the spouse that was now seeking to modify the amount of medical expenses that they had to pay.