The following is an example of a holiday visitation schedule that has worked for many parents:

In even numbered years, the Father has Thanksgiving and the second week of Christmas Vacation/Winter Break (beginning the afternoon of Christmas Day), while the Mother has Easter/Spring Break and the first week of Christmas Vacation/Winter Break (ending the afternoon of Christmas Day). In odd numbered years, the Father has Easter/Spring Break and the first week of Christmas Vacation/Winter Break (ending the afternoon of Christmas Day), while the Mother has Thanksgiving and the second week of Christmas Vacation/Winter Break (beginning the afternoon of Christmas Day). The Mother has Mother’s Day every year, and the Father has Father’s Day every year. Any holiday that falls on a Monday (i.e. Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, Memorial Day, Labor Day) will belong to the parent who has the children the preceding weekend.

For example, if the father makes $40,000 per year and the mother makes $60,000 per year, and the health insurance premium is $100/month, the father will be responsible for $40 and the mother will be responsible for $60. If the father is the child support payor and he is the one paying the premiums, his child support obligation will be lowered by $60/month, which is the amount of the health insurance premium for which the mother is responsible.

“Standard visitation” is generally every other weekend with one overnight during the week in which the non-custodial parent does not have weekend visitation. Standard visitation includes an equal split of all holidays. Each parent generally has half of the holidays each year with the holidays rotating every other year. For example, one parent will have Thanksgiving with the children in even numbered years and the other parent will have Thanksgiving with the children in odd numbered years. In addition, with standard visitation, each parent generally has blocks of extended time (2-3 weeks) during the summer for vacations with the children.

Our divorce law firm likes to use “standard visitation” as a starting point for custody and visitation discussions as the “standard visitation” outlined above does not work for all families. Some families want different holidays addressed while work commitments may keep some parents from having overnights with the children during the week. Whatever your family’s situation, it is important to find a visitation schedule that works well for both parents as well as the children.

(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection, or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under Code Section 19-9-67 or 19-9-68 and:
(A) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
(B) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(3) All courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under Code Section 19-9-67 or 19-9-68; or
(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection.” O.C.G.A. §19-9-61(a).

The Court of Appeals affirmed Georgia’s jurisdiction under subsection OCGA 19-9-61(a)(3), stating that “[t]he trial court made specific reference to the West Virginia court's order, which explicitly found that Heather still had a Georgia driver's license, was a registered voter in Georgia, had utility bills in her name coming to her Georgia address, and had student loan and credit card bills in her name coming to her Georgia address.” Cohen at 9. Those facts, combined with the fact that the dismissal in West Virginia was not appealed, made jurisdiction proper in Georgia.

Generally, since Fulton County was the court that entered the original custody ruling, Fulton County had “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” over the modification action unless the court determines that it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. OCGA §19-9-67. To make that determination, OCGA §19-9-67(b) requires the court to consider all of the following factors:

(1) Whether family violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
(2) The length of time the child has resided outside this state;
(3) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
(4) The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
(6) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;
(7) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.

In vacating the decision of the Fulton County court, the Court of Appeals did not say that the end result was incorrect per se, but rather emphasized that the court did not consider and reference ALL of the required factors in its written Order in making its decision that it was no longer a convenient forum. Id. at 64. Thus, the Court of Appeals directed the trial courts to always consider ALL of the factors in making a jurisdiction decision.

Upon appeal by the wife, the Court of Appeals reversed, relying on well-settled Supreme Court of Georgia rulings and stating that "in Georgia, a trial court cannot order incarceration pursuant to a self-effectuating order, regarding future acts, without benefit of a hearing." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Smith, 280 Ga. 620, 621 (632 SE2d 83) (2006). The Court went on to state that even when a hearing has been held adjudging a person in contempt, the trial court cannot sign an order of incarceration based upon a letter from an interested individual. Bauman at 264. The Court of Appeals quoted the Supreme Court of Georgia, which held that “the court may only act, at a minimum, on an ‘affidavit . . . from a neutral and disinterested court official or other officer based upon objective information.’” Hall v. Doyle-Hall, 284 Ga. 325, 326 (667 SE2d 81) (2008).

Generally, alimony is to be awarded based upon the needs of the party to whom it is awarded and the ability of the other party to pay. OCGA § 19-6-1 (c). In determining whether alimony should be awarded, and the amount thereof, the court looks at many factors, including the separate assets of each party and their earning capacities. OCGA § 19-6-1 (a). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the wife’s anticipated expenses justified her need for alimony, but stated that “the record is completely devoid of any evidence of Husband's ability to pay the trial court's lump sum alimony award.” Id. at 22. Without that evidence, the award must be reversed.

In Kauttner v. Kauttner, the wife filed for divorce and the husband requested a jury trial. Kautter v. Kautter, 286 Ga. 16 (2009). When the case was called for trial, the husband deliberately chose not to attend and instructed his attorney not to participate in the proceedings. As a result, the wife filed a motion to strike the jury demand. The Gwinnett Superior Court granted the wife’s motion and conducted a bench trial, and the husband appealed.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the granting of the motion to strike the husband’s demand for jury trial. The Court emphasized that the husband knew of the trial date and had no legitimate reason for not attending. Though the husband argued that by not attending he did not intend to waive the demand for jury trial, the Court stated that his actions were an implicit waiver and the trial court was authorized to strike his demand.

The Georgia Supreme Court agreed, stating that “[t]he language of OCGA § 19-6-15 (i) (2) (J) (ii) makes clear that a portion of the basic child support obligation is intended to cover average amounts of special expenses for raising children, including the cost of extracurricular activities.” Id. The Court referred further to the child support statute, clarifying that if the trial court determines that the full amount of special expenses (which includes extracurricular activities) exceeds 7% of the basic child support obligation, the additional amount must be considered a deviation addressed on Schedule E of the Child Support Worksheets with specific findings as to why such deviation is necessary. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court stated that the way the trial court handled extracurricular activities, by including an additional provision in the final judgment and decree of divorce apportioning them, was improper under the current child support guidelines.

The treatment of extracurricular activities is an important concept to keep in mind. In looking at a requested deviation for these activities, the court is going to want and need justification for these activities, especially if the payor is claiming that these activities are unnecessary for the children.

When the parties’ eldest child turned 18 years old, the husband filed a Complaint for Modification of Child Support stating that his child support obligation should be modified downward accordingly. The trial court refused to give the husband an opportunity to present evidence of whether the child had turned 18 and graduated from high school and, rather, dismissed the modification action, finding no substantial change warranting a modification and awarded the wife attorney’s fees.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court’s ruling, thereby allowing the husband’s modification action to proceed. The Court looked at the plain language of the divorce decree and found no ambiguity, reasoning that the language shows that the parties contemplated a change in the husband’s child support obligation. Since the parties contemplated a change, the husband should have been able to present evidence showing that a change was warranted. This case shows the importance of the language in your divorce decree. The court is going to look at the actual language of the Order regardless of whether you or your spouse believes you have agreed to something else. If something is important to you, make sure it is in the Order and written very clearly so that it cannot be misinterpreted.

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue in Taylor v. Curl (A09A0749). In that case, subsequent to the parties’ Jackson County divorce, the mother moved with the children to Florida and the father moved to Walker County. While the children were visiting the father, he filed a petition for temporary and emergency custody of his children in the Superior Court of Walker County, citing mistreatment and abuse of the children by their mother. The mother appealed arguing that Walker County was not the proper venue for the custody modification. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling granting temporary custody to the father, thereby affirming jurisdiction. Since the father met the two requirements outlined in O.C.G.A. §19-9-64(a), the trial court properly exercised temporary, emergency jurisdiction.

After the oral ruling but before entry of the final decree of divorce, the husband offered to purchase the wife’s interest in the house for $325,000, but the wife rejected this offer. Shortly after the final decree was entered, the wife accepted an offer on the house from the parties’ daughter in the amount of $650,150, which the husband rejected. The wife then filed a motion to hold the husband in contempt for rejecting this offer and the husband filed a motion for contempt against the wife for rejecting his offer. The Judge found the wife in contempt.

The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, stating adamantly that the wife could not be held in contempt of the divorce decree because there was no divorce decree entered at the time of husband’s offer. “Before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order should inform him in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him, and the command must therefore be express rather than implied. [Cit.]" (Punctuation omitted.) Hall v. Nelson, 282 Ga. 441, 444 (3) (651 SE2d 72) (2007).” Simply put, an oral Order is not sufficient for contempt. A person is not bound by a divorce decree until it is in writing and entered by the court.

Unlike child support, there is no statutory formula for determining alimony. Rather, there are eight statutory factors that the Judge can consider in awarding the amount and length of alimony, if any. O.C.G.A. §19-6-5(a). http://www.atlantadivorceattorneyblog.com/2008/10/what_are_the_factors_in_determ.html#more Here, the Supreme Court found that the trial court had discretion to consider length of the parties’ entire relationship as a factor in determining alimony under O.C.G.A. §19-6-5(a)(8), a catch-all provision allowing the court to consider “such other relevant factors as the court deems equitable and proper.” Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[i]n the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of alimony . . . and to this end they are to use their experience as enlightened persons in judging the amount necessary for support under the evidence as disclosed by the record and all the facts and circumstances of the case.” Arkwright v. Arkwright, 284 Ga. 545, 546 (2) (a) (668 SE2d 709) (2008).