In her appeal, the wife alleges “she is not precluded from contesting paternity.” Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with her, stating neither the purported agreement nor the temporary order determined the issue on a final basis as there was not yet a final order in the case. Id. at 177.

However, even the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the wife had the right to contest paternity, it agreed with the trial court’s denial of her motion, which was based on the “best interest of the child” standard. Id. The wife had a huge hurdle to overcome since “[a]ll children born in wedlock are deemed under law to be legitimate.” Id. Further, “[t]he public policy favoring the presumption of a child’s legitimacy is one of the most firmly-established and persuasive precepts known in law.” Id., quoting Baker v. Baker, 376 Ga. 778, 779 (1) (582 SE2d 102) (2003). In affirming the denial of the wife’s motion to compel paternity testing, the Court of Appeals followed established Georgia law and held, “…even when the child's legal father may not be the biological father, a mother who wishes to delegitimate her child is not automatically entitled to compel the legal father to submit to genetic paternity testing but must first come forward with evidence sufficient to show that delegitimating the child is in the child's best interest. The record in this case contains no such threshold showing.” Williamson, 302 Ga. App. at 118.

The mother appealed, contending “the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the GAL's report and recommendation… without considering the impact on the children of the Husband's out-of-state move.” Id. The Georiga Supreme Court disagreed, quoting a seminal relocation case, which states: “When exercising its discretion in relocation cases, as in all child custody cases, the trial court must consider the best interests of the child and cannot apply a bright-line test…[T]he primary consideration of the trial court in deciding custody matters must be directed to the best interests of the child involved, that all other rights are secondary, and that any determination of the best interests of the child must be made on a case-by-case basis. This analysis forbids the presumption that a relocating custodial parent will always lose custody and, conversely, forbids any presumption in favor of relocation.” Id., quoting Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445 (2003). The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the transcript and found that the trial court’s consideration of the father’s move “in regard to the children’s welfare and its pragmatic consequences were pivotal” in its custody determinations. Almon-Davis at 458.

Thus, in relocation cases, there is not a presumption that someone will win or lose custody due to a party moving out of the city or state. The court will always look at the specific facts of the case and determine the best interests of the children involved.

Account statements - Bring the most recent statement for any accounts that are in your name, your spouse’s name (if it is available to you), and your joint names. This includes statements for checking/savings accounts, investment accounts, retirement accounts, credit cards, and stock options. These statements will give your attorney a good idea of the assets that will be equitably divided between your and your spouse.

Bills – Bring the most recent statement for each bill that is paid by you and/or your spouse. This includes utility bills, mortgage statements, insurance statements, medical expenses, car payments, children’s expenses and credit card statements. These documents will help in alimony/child support negotiations, and will help determine who should pay these expenses while the divorce is pending and thereafter.

Income – Bring your most recent paystub and that of your spouse (if you have access to it). In addition, bring tax returns for the previous 3 years. Income plays a large role in most divorces so it is important that your attorney has a clear picture of this issue.

In general, bring everything to your first meeting with an attorney that you think is important to your case. Once the attorney has all the information, he/she can work with you to manage your expectations about your divorce and determine the appropriate steps to take to reach a positive outcome in your case.

The father appealed the trial court’s denial of additional visitation arguing that “the trial court is out of sync with current opinion about the need to establish a firm parental bond between a child and his or her non-custodial parent,” and referencing two models recommending “that children have more visitation time, including overnight visits, with non-custodial parents, beginning at an early age, and increasing as the child grows older.” Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia pointed out, however, “the record does not reflect that that these models were presented to the trial court; nor does it show that trial counsel made the argument which husband asserts on appeal.” Id. Thus, these arguments could not be relied upon on appeal. The father had to prove that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the evidence presented to it, and this the father could not do.

However, the timing of the filing of the Complaint for Divorce may be important in some situations. For example, if you discover your spouse is having an affair and you wait awhile to file for divorce, the court could use this timing to find that the affair was not the cause of the divorce, which could allow the cheating spouse to suffer no repercussions from his/her behavior during the divorce action. Thus, it is important that you provide your Atlanta divorce attorney with as much information as possible about your unique situation so that he/she can assess whether the timing of filing the Complaint for Divorce could be advantageous for you.

If neither wants to nor can afford to remain in the marital home, an option is for the parties to put the house on the market. In this case, the parties can work together with an agent, or alternate, with one party being in charge of the sale for 6 months and then the other party being in charge for the next 6 months. Of course, this option presupposes that the house will sell in a reasonable period of time, which, in this market, may not be the case. During the time the house is on the market, the parties will continue to be responsible for mortgage payments, etc., and must work out who will live in the house and pay utilities.

Another option is for one party to keep the house and refinance to take the other party’s name off the loan(s). This seems simple enough, but the refinancing party must be able to take on the entire loan. Since all of the marital assets will be split incident to the divorce, each party will most likely end up with only half of what the parties had as a married couple. In addition, in the case of dual income families, the parties likely qualified for the mortgage with combined incomes. Both of these issues may make it difficult for the party who wants to remain in the house to qualify to put the entire loan amount into his/her name.

Finally, no matter which option the parties choose or the judge orders, there is the very real possibility that the house is worth less than the amount owed on it. In this situation, the parties may be faced with the possibility of having to come to the table with money upon the sale of the house, or possibly foreclosing.

After both parents separated from the military, the father filed a Petition for Modification of Custody and the trial court found that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a change of primary physical custody to the father. Id. at 388. The mother appealed, arguing that the grounds upon which the trial court relied were equally weighted and, thus, custody should remain the same.

Upon review of the transcript and record, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The Court of Appeals reiterated that the trial court must look at the best interests of the child in determining custody, which they did in this case. The transcript did show that “the trial court acknowledged that both parties were fit and nurturing parents; that both had established a loving relationship with the child; and that since the time of the divorce, the parties had shared equal custody of the child.” Id. at 390. However, the trial court found that the father had a strong support system by living near his family, and that the child had developed a strong bond with the paternal grandparents from spending so much time there while his parents were deployed. Id. Under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals agreed that these facts tipped the scales in favor of the father and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father primary custody.

Despite a challenge by the executor of the husband’s estate, who argued that the settlement agreement terminated the wife’s rights as a payable on death payee, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in favor of the wife. The Court stated that though the wife “relinquished the interest she may have had in the account by virtue of her marriage,” the settlement agreement language was not sufficiently broad so as to waive “her right to payment from the POD account as the death beneficiary specified by [the husband] when he created the account and so remaining on the day he died.” Id. at 4.

In this case, the facts are not clear whether the husband intended to remove his ex-wife as beneficiary. Either way, it is a lesson to those going through a divorce of how important it is to make sure your settlement agreement addresses all assets clearly and to check and/or change the beneficiaries of any accounts you may have to prevent unintended consequences.

The mother appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in enforcing the settlement agreement “because she did not assent to the terms of the settlement and lacked capacity to contract at the time in question due to her medical condition,” and argued that the trial court “refused to receive any evidence from the parties” at the hearing on the father’s motion. Id. at 332. The mother’s allegations regarding evidence at the hearing, however, were disputed by the father and inconsistent with the trial court’s order on the motion. The Georgia Court of Appeals, therefore, affirmed, citing well established case law stating that “'[i]n order for the appellate court to determine whether the judgment appealed from was erroneous, it is the duty of the appellant to include in the record those items which will enable the appellate court to perform an objective review of the evidence and proceedings.'" Atwood v. Southeast Bedding Co., 236 Ga. App. 116 (1) (511 S.E.2d 232) (1999). Id. at 332-333. Further, "'where the proof necessary for determination of the issues on appeal is omitted from the record, an appellate court must assume that the judgment below was correct and affirm.'" Enchanted Valley RV Park Resort v. Weese, 241 Ga. App. 415, 417 (1) (c) (526 SE2d 124) (1999). Id. Because there was no transcript or other evidence in the record on appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals was bound to presume that the trial court was correct.

The father appealed, contending that “trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was not personally served with the modification petition,” but the Georgia Court of Appeals rejected his argument. Id. at 208. The Court affirmed long standing Georgia law holding that the father “personally appeared at the hearing on the modification petition,” and “[n]othing in the record shows that [he] raised the issue of insufficient service of process at that time.” Id. The father, therefore, implicitly consented to jurisdiction and waived any claim of insufficient service of process. Id.

In a custody case in which the child is 14 or older, “the child shall have the right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live,” and “[t]he child's selection for purposes of custody shall be presumptive unless the parent so selected is determined [by the judge] not to be in the best interests of the child.” O.C.G.A. 19-9-3(a)(5).

In a contested custody case in which the child is between 11 and 14 years of age, “the judge shall consider the desires and educational needs of the child in determining which parent shall have custody,” and “shall have complete discretion in making this determination.” O.C.G.A. 19-9-3(a)(6). For this age group, “the child's desires shall not be controlling.” The judge is to consider the child’s desires and has discretion in how to do so, but “the best interests of the child standard shall be controlling.” O.C.G.A. 19-9-3(a)(6).