Atlanta Divorce Attorney Blog

We recently represented a husband in a successful appeal of his dismissed child support modification action. The parties were divorced in 2007 and, according to the final judgment and decree of divorce, the wife was awarded primary custody of the 4 children and the husband was obligated to pay child support. Specifically, the final judgment and decree stated that child support would be “due and payable. . . until such time as the youngest minor child dies, marries, enters the military, attains the age of eighteen, or is otherwise emancipated, whichever first occurs; provided, however, that in the event that any of the minor children turn 18 years of age while still in high school, [Husband's] child support obligations shall continue for that child until such time as the child graduates from high school, but in no event to extend past the child's twentieth birthday.” (emphasis added) Grenevitch v. Grenevitch, S09A0320

When the parties’ eldest child turned 18 years old, the husband filed a Complaint for Modification of Child Support stating that his child support obligation should be modified downward accordingly. The trial court refused to give the husband an opportunity to present evidence of whether the child had turned 18 and graduated from high school and, rather, dismissed the modification action, finding no substantial change warranting a modification and awarded the wife attorney’s fees.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court’s ruling, thereby allowing the husband’s modification action to proceed. The Court looked at the plain language of the divorce decree and found no ambiguity, reasoning that the language shows that the parties contemplated a change in the husband’s child support obligation. Since the parties contemplated a change, the husband should have been able to present evidence showing that a change was warranted. This case shows the importance of the language in your divorce decree. The court is going to look at the actual language of the Order regardless of whether you or your spouse believes you have agreed to something else. If something is important to you, make sure it is in the Order and written very clearly so that it cannot be misinterpreted.

One of the most confusing aspects of child custody cases can be where the case should be filed when the parents live in different states. Generally, in regards to custody modification actions, the law limits a parent’s ability to terminate the continuing jurisdiction of the court that made the original custody determination in order to prevent the noncustodial parent from trying to use his or her “home jurisdiction advantage” to modify custody to the disadvantage of the custodial parent. There is, however, one exception to this general rule which provides that a Georgia court "has temporary emergency jurisdiction [to make a child custody determination] if the child is present in this state and . . . it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." O.C.G.A. §19-9-64(a).

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue in Taylor v. Curl (A09A0749). In that case, subsequent to the parties’ Jackson County divorce, the mother moved with the children to Florida and the father moved to Walker County. While the children were visiting the father, he filed a petition for temporary and emergency custody of his children in the Superior Court of Walker County, citing mistreatment and abuse of the children by their mother. The mother appealed arguing that Walker County was not the proper venue for the custody modification. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling granting temporary custody to the father, thereby affirming jurisdiction. Since the father met the two requirements outlined in O.C.G.A. §19-9-64(a), the trial court properly exercised temporary, emergency jurisdiction.

An interesting alimony modification case from Cumming, Georgia was recently reviewed (and affirmed) by the Georgia Supreme Court on April 28, 2009. See Crosby v. Lebert (S09A09). The facts in that case indicated that parties were divorced in December of 2005. The parties had entered into a settlement agreement in their Forsyth County divorce that required the Husband to make monthly installments on a Cadillac Escalade, but the payments were clearly defined as permanent periodic alimony, which "terminate upon remarriage of the party to whom the obligations are owed" under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5 (b). Additionally, the Husband was required to pay the Wife’s health insurance, but these payments were considered periodic alimony payments as well. The Wife remarried in April of 2006 and the Husband informed her that she would be responsible for the remaining payments on the automobile and her own health insurance.

When the Wife protested, the Husband filed a Declaratory Judgment and moved for Summary Judgment. OCGA § 19-6-5 (b) states that "All obligations for permanent alimony, however created, the time for performance of which has not arrived, shall terminate upon remarriage of the party to whom the obligations are owed unless otherwise provided." The Forsyth County divorce judge agreed with the Husband and the Wife became responsible for the remaining payments on the Escalade and her health insurance.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Wife argued that the Husband was supposed to “pay all monthly installment payments of Wife’s vehicle until the vehicle is paid in full” and he could therefore not stop his payments because of her remarriage. The rest of that provision , however, stated “…and shall do so in the form of permanent periodic alimony” (emphasis added). The Supreme Court found that the second half of the provision clearly showed the intent of the parties was to have it governed by OCGA § 19-6-5 (b).

On March 23, 2009, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s denial of the wife’s motion for new trial in her divorce action in Rembert v. Rembert (S08F1582). Specifically, the wife alleged that the trial court erred in granting final decision making authority to the husband, who was the primary physical custodian of the parties’ children, and in awarding primary physical custody to the husband.

In regard to decision making, the wife argued that the parties did not truly have joint legal custody because the husband had final decision making authority. The Supreme Court disagreed, reaffirming a prior holding that the language of the statute governing legal custody “clearly vests in the trial court discretion to decide which parent should be empowered to make final decisions where the parents are unable to agree.” Citing Frazier v. Frazier, 280 Ga. 687, 690 (2006). As the primary physical custodian, it was appropriate that the father had final decision making authority in the likely event that the parties would not agree.

In regard to primary physical custody, the Supreme Court held that it would not disturb the trial court’s judgment awarding custody to the father, who had a stable home and a job with a regular schedule, instead of the mother, who was dating a married man, was a full time student with substantial debt, and had threatened the life of a neighbor.

On January 28, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Gwinnett County Juvenile Court regarding the modification of a temporary child support award in a deprivation case. In In the Interest of R.F. (A08A1683), a biological mother’s five children were found to be deprived and removed from her custody, and she was ordered to pay child support to the temporary custodians. She alleged that the trial court erred by treating her motion as one for modification of child support rather than a final child support order, ignoring statutory guidelines in determining the child support amount, and in refusing to modify the previous order.

The Court of Appeals rejected the mother’s argument that her petition was one for a final child support order. The Court questioned whether a juvenile court was the proper jurisdiction for a final child support order, but rested its holding on the fact that there had been no final disposition of the deprivation proceedings and, thus, there could be no final order.

The mother further contended that the trial court erred in treating funds from trust proceeds as her income for purposes of a child support determination. The Court of Appeals easily dismissed this argument, citing to O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(f)(1)(A)(x), which states that both trust income and gifts that consist of cash should be included in calculating gross income for child support purposes.

In addition, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in refusing to modify the child support amount. Interestingly, though the mother was trying to modify her support obligation downward, she argued that the substantial change warranting modification was the fact that the children had increased educational expenses. The Court simply stated that “the fact that the needs of the children have increased cannot serve as the basis for decreasing the amount of child support a parent is obligated to pay” and found no other basis for downward modification, based upon the evidence presented at trial.

On November 13, 2008, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a ruling in Kean v. Marshall (A08A0828) regarding the issue of proper jurisdiction for a child support modification action. The original child support Order was in Alabama, but the Mother sought to record and modify the Order in Georgia pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The Mother filed her Petition in Henry County, Georgia, contending that the Father resided there and was, therefore, subject to jurisdiction. The trial court denied the Father’s motion to dismiss the action due to lack of jurisdiction and entered an Order modifying the child support amount.

The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling finding that the evidence reflected that the Father was domiciled in Alabama. The Court of Appeals placed emphasis on the fact that the Father “was registered to vote in Alabama, has always paid Alabama income taxes, has an Alabama driver’s license, and cares for his elderly father in Alabama.” There was also extensive evidence that the Father considered Alabama to be his home and intended to remain there, despite his military placement. Though the Mother argued that he resided in Georgia because he spent time there in the military and entered into an apartment lease while he was there, the Court of Appeals specifically found that the term “reside” does not mean “domiciled,” and that a person’s domicile is the place where the person resides with an intent to remain permanently or for an indefinite period of time. In reversing the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he proper focus is whether the record contained evidence that [the Father] took any action to change his residence from Alabama to Georgia, and the record is devoid of evidence showing any such action.”

Interestingly, in this case, the Order modifying child support was based upon an agreement by the parties with the Father reserving his right to appeal based on lack of jurisdiction.

Our final blog entry in our Atlanta Divorce Lawyers Guide to Divorce and Family Law Cases in Fulton County, Georgia is in regards to the Fulton County’s Guardian Ad Litem program. A Guardian Ad Litem is an attorney who has had at least 20 hours of specialized training for child welfare and custody issues. In cases involving contested child custody, modifications of custody, modification of visitation, allegations of child neglect or child abuse, the Court can assign a Guardian Ad Litem to more closely evaluate the situation and report back to the court its findings. The Court or the Guardian Ad Litem can order psychological evaluations and drug testing if applicable to help in making a custody determination.

The cost of a Guardian Ad Litem can be rather high for most divorces in Georgia. Litigants should be aware that Fulton County offers a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) at a reduced hourly rate.

According to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-28.1(b), the licensing agencies in Georgia can revoke or suspend someone’s license if he or she is in arrears behind in paying child support for a period of more than sixty days. Not only can the Georgia Department of Driver Services suspend someone’s drivers license, but the person’s professional license, such as a license to practice medicine. A business license as well as hunting and fishing licenses can also be suspended. Also, if the non-paying parent applies for the license, the application can be denied based solely on the fact that he or she is in arrears with child support. Georgia is not the first state to implement such a drastic law to punish parents who are in arrears. For years, the states of Ohio, Tennessee, and Arizona, have suspended drivers licenses because someone owes back owed child support to their ex-spouse.

When this law comes into effect in July, there are going to be those who support the law and who oppose it. Some people may feel that it is unfair because if they don’t have a driver’s license, then they cannot get to work to earn the money to pay child support. Prior to revoking or suspending someone’s license, the court will notify the person who is in arrears. If he or she is able and willing to cooperate with the court to make their child support obligation current and to provide evidence to the court, then the court will consider this and may not revoke or suspend his or her license according to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-28.1(b). This law is meant only to punish those who do not plan on becoming current with their child support obligations. Once the court has contacted the person and has determined that he or she is not going to pay the back owed child support, then the court will enter into an order and contact the licensing agency for the person’s failure to pay child support. If the licensing agency revokes or suspends his or her license, then the licensing agency will contact the court according to O.C.G.A. §19-6-28.1(b).

Continue reading "Penalties for not paying child support in Georgia: License revocation" »

In Georgia, child support orders may be modified upon a showing of a substantial change in either parent’s income or financial status, or in the needs of the children. O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(k)(1). A substantial change could include the loss of a job, decrease in income, increase in income, increase in the medical needs of the children, increase in the educational needs of the children (i.e. private school, tutoring, etc.), or decrease in the needs of the children (i.e. child no longer needs day care). This substantial change must occur between the date of the divorce decree or previous child support action and the filing of the new petition for modification of child support.

Generally, you can only bring a child support modification action once every two years so keep this in mind when deciding whether or not to file a modification. The two year limitation does not apply from the date of your divorce decree, but rather from the date of your last modification. In other words, you could bring a modification action within a few months of your divorce decree, but you would have to wait two years after that modification action before you could come back to court again. There are three exceptions to this two year rule: (1) If the non-custodial parent has failed to exercise court ordered visitation; (2) if the non-custodial parent has exercised more visitation than provided in the court order; or (3) the modification action is based upon an involuntary loss of income. O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(k)(2)(A) – (C).

Any modification of these orders must be done prospectively. This means that the Court can only modify these orders from the date of the filing of a petition. The Court cannot retroactively modify court orders from the date of the substantial change.

The Georgia Court of Appeals has entered a decision on November 13, 2008 in regards to the effective date of a modification of child support award. In Hampton v Nesbit(A08A1887) the court of appeals held that the Judge Merck, DeKalb Superior Court, abused its discretion in ordering a delay in the upward modification of child support until such time as the past due child support payments have been made.

In that action, the father had filed a petition seeking joint physical and legal custody of the minor child. The mother counterclaimed for contempt due to father’s past due child support payments. After hearing evidence, the trial court entered an income deduction order against the father which ordered the father to repay the arrearages at a rate of $300 per month beginning October 1, 2007 in order to avoid jail time and increased the amount of child support from $525 per month to $800 per month starting October 1, 2008 (at which point the trial court determined that the father should be caught up with his arrearages). The mother appealed indicating that the trial court could not delay the effective date of the upward award of modification.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the trial court did not have the right to fully delay implementation of the upward modification. Specifically, the Court of Appeals focused its attention upon O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(3)(B) which provides:

If there is a difference of 30 percent or more between a new award and a Georgia child support order entered prior to January 1, 2007, the court may, at its discretion, phase in the new child support award over a period of up to two years with the phasing in being largely evenly distributed with at least an initial immediate adjustment of not less than 25 percent of the difference and at least one intermediate adjustment prior to the final adjustment at the end of the phase-in period.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals specifically held that while the trial court did not have authority to completely delay the modification it could have phased in the modification had the statutory requirements been met. Of note, the Court of Appeals also held that past due child support cannot be considered when reducing or increasing income under the child support calculations.

With the state of the economy in the United States today, it is not uncommon to hear that more and more people are losing their jobs and having difficulty finding new jobs that pay as well as their previous ones. While this is obviously having a huge effect on our economy as a whole, it is also creating new difficulties with individual’s child support obligations.

If you find yourself in this type of position, it is important to learn what to do, and not to do. The biggest mistake we see people make is that they don’t do anything. They stop paying child support and do not file anything with the court seeking assistance with this type of situation. This is the quickest way to find yourself in a contempt action and facing possible jail time.

Instead, if you are no longer able to pay child support or alimony because of your changed financial status, you can and should file a modification action with the court. This is the only way to legally change your support obligation. The court will not honor any verbal agreements that you and your spouse may make.

Continue reading "Modification of Child Support and/or Alimony After the Loss of a Job in Georgia" »

Although there are several grounds for ending alimony, one of the most common is that a party decides to remarry. In these types of cases, O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(b) indicates that a prior award of alimony can be modified if you decide to get re-married, and the modification will result in terminating your former spouse’s alimony obligation. What many people find surprising, however, is that remarriage is not the exclusive defining test for ending alimony.

Much more common is that after a parties divorce, one of the parties decides to date and eventually decides, without getting remarried, to move into the same residence with their new significant other. The State of Georgia has enacted a law, which is commonly referred to as the “live-in” lover statute, which addresses this exact situation. According to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b), if you and your significant other are living together and having sexual relations, then your former spouse can file for modification of alimony upon the ground that you and your significant other are living together in a meretricious relationship. Adding to the equation, the court will be under the assumption in this type of situation that your need for alimony has just decreased because you are now splitting financial responsibilities with this person.

When deciding whether you want to seek a modification under this type of situation, you need to keep in mind that the court will require that you submit proof of this meretricious relationship. In addition, you must always be mindful that if the judge decides after reviewing the petition and the evidence that your former spouse is not living in a meretricious relationship, then you would be responsible for paying all of your former spouse’s attorney’s fees incurred in defending the action in addition to being responsible for your own attorney’s fees.

The Georgia Supreme Court issued an order today in Pineres v. George, S08A0773, which has several implications for Georgia law. First, it held that a trial judge has no authority in a contempt proceeding to modify the obligations imposed by a divorce decree. Second, the Georgia Supreme Court held that medical expenses constitute a form a child support.

Of note in this case, the modification being sought was in regards to the psychological expenses for the minor child and there had previously been a petition for modification of child support made less than two years ago. Because Georgia law prohibits a modification of child support less than two years after an order on a previous modification petition by the same spouse, it upheld an awarded of frivolous litigation fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 against the spouse that was now seeking to modify the amount of medical expenses that they had to pay.